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ABSTRACT
This case study presents the tale of the academic discovery of a rare muta-
tion for early-onset Alzheimer’s disease that was patented by a sole inven-
tor and licensed to a non-practicing entity (NPE), the Alzheimer’s Institute
of America (AIA). Our aims are (1) to relate this story about patents, re-
search tools, and impediments to medical progress, and (2) to inform on-
going debates about how patents affect research, disposition of university
inventions, and the distribution of benefits from publicly funded research.
We present an account of the hunt for Alzheimer’s genes, their patenting,
assignment, and enforcement based on literature, litigation records and ju-
dicial decisions. While AIA’s litigation eventually failed, its suits against 18
defendants, including one university, one foundation, and three non-profit
organizations were costly in court years, legal fees, and expert time. Reasons
for the failure included non-disclosure of co-inventors, State laws on owner-
ship and assignment of university inventions, and enablement. We discuss
the policy implications of the litigation, questioning the value of patents in
the research ecosystem and the role of NPEs (“patent trolls”) in biotechno-
logical innovation.The case illustrates tactics that may be deployed against
NPEs, including, avenues to invalidate patent claims, Authorization and
C© The Author 2015. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of Duke University School of Law, Harvard
Law School, Oxford University Press, and Stanford Law School. This is an Open Access article distributed under
the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/),
which permits unrestricted reuse, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is
properly cited.
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Consent, legislative reforms specifically targeting NPEs, reforms in the
America Invents Act, and judicial action and rules for judicial proceedings.
In the highly competitive research environment of Alzheimer’s genetics in
the 1990s, patents played a minor, subordinate role in spurring innovation.
The case produces a mixed message about the patent system. It illustrates
many mistakes in how patents were obtained, administered, and enforced,
but, eventually, the legal system rectified thesemistakes, albeit slowly, labo-
riously, and at great cost.
KEYWORDS: Alzheimer’s disease genetics, research tool, non-practicing
entity, patent litigation, patent troll reform, enablement, Authorization and
Consent
This case study is a cautionary tale about a patented genetic discovery, a doublemu-
tation in a gene conferring high risk of Alzheimer’s disease.The patent was licensed as a
research tool to expandunderstandingof themolecular andgenetic basis ofAlzheimer’s
disease. Our goals are first, to relate an intricate, fascinating story about patents, re-
search tools, and impediments to medical progress and, second, to inform ongoing de-
bates about whether and how patents can affect research, disposition of ownership of
university inventions, and the just distribution of benefits frompublicly fundedmedical
research.
Randall Rader, in his dissent as former Chief Judge of the US Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit (CAFC) inMomenta Pharma. v Amphastar Pharma, concluded that
‘patents on research tools andbiomedical innovations donot significantly slow thepace
of research and do not deter researchers from pursuing promising projects’.1 Patent
owners, he said, do not sue researchers because ‘experiments do not produce income
or a source of damages’.2 Indeed, disclosure in patent documents ‘encourages publi-
cation and sharing of research results’.3 Our case study is a counterexample to temper
Chief Judge Rader’s sanguine assessment. While it describes an unusual outlier exam-
ple and is not an argument against patents, this case study suggests that without a clear
research exemption, or other mechanisms to enable access to research tools, biomedi-
cal researchers can face patent infringement litigation that imposes significant costs and
slows down both academic and commercial scientific inquiry.
The story began in the early 1980swith research into the genetics ofAmyloidPrecur-
sor Protein (APP) and its linkage to early-onset Alzheimer’s disease. Key researchers
were active in Europe and the USA. Patents on a particular double mutation, APPswe,
were filed in the early 1990s, listing a clinician-researcher, Dr Michael Mullan, as sole
inventor.The patents covered nucleotide sequences coding for a rare double mutation
identified in two Swedish families.Thepatents also claimed cell lines, transgenicmouse
models, and assay and screeningmethods incorporating themutation.The institutions
that hosted the researchweredeliberately excluded fromthepatent rights. Stakeholders
1 686 F.3d 1348, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2012) at 1375 (summarizing academic literature and policy reports that find
a lack of data to support the anticommons hypothesis at).
2 Id. (citing Wesley M. Cohen & John P. Walsh, Real Impediments to Academic Biomedical Research, in 8 INNO-
VATIONPOL’Y&ECONOMY 1, 12 (AdamB. Jaffe et al. eds., 2008), http://www.nber.org/chapters/c5300.pdf)
(accessedMar. 25, 2015).
3 Id. at 1376.
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affected by the patents included other researchers and their institutions, pharmaceu-
tical and biotechnology companies, philanthropists, foundations, and venture capital
firms.The lead researcher, Mullan, assigned key patents to a non-practicing entity, the
Alzheimer’s Institute of America (AIA), which enforced rights against research uses.
The patent rights were used to generate revenues, but the disposition of those revenues
is difficult to trace. AIA may have sponsored some of Mullan’s further research but is
not acknowledged as a funder in the research publications from Mullan’s team.4 The
families fromwhom themutationswere isolated received none of the financial benefits,
and are likely unaware that their mutation was used to enrich one researcher and a ven-
ture capitalist with the result of impeding Alzheimer’s research. Ironically, after nearly
a decade of litigation, claims in the patents might or might not have been deemed valid
under current patent jurisprudence.5 We will never know, because the patents were
deemed invalid based on inappropriate assignment and inventorship.
Thecase study is of interest because it illustrates a non-practicing entity (NPE)using
patent rights over research tools to extract revenue from those striving to understand
and treat Alzheimer’s disease. AIA’s enforcement against non-profit research institu-
tions caused considerable consternation in Alzheimer’s research circles.The case study
touches on key points in ongoing debates about the value of patents in the research
ecosystem.Did patent rights create incentives to do the research? Almost certainly not,
at least for the initial discovery, since the samples were collected and grants secured
long before the patent story began to unfold. How were contributions to the research
evaluated and rewarded? How did legal frameworks enable university ownership, even
without federal funding in theUSA?Howwas enforcementof patent rights against non-
profit research institutions enabled, and who was benefited? What mechanisms were
brought to bear to mitigate the impact of the enforcement litigation? The case illus-
trates many mistakes in how patents were granted, administered, and enforced, but, in
the end, the legal system rectified many of these errors, albeit after long delay and at
great expense.
We begin with a brief account of the genetics of early-onset familial Alzheimer’s dis-
ease and the discovery of theAPP gene, thenmove on to the patents, and finally discuss
patent assignment and enforcement: the resolution ofmany infringement lawsuits, and
the lessons learned. Our account is based on data available in the public record from
disparate sources: scientific publications, patents, news and commentary, biographies,
and most importantly, litigation records and judicial decisions. The legal proceedings
include findings of fact by the district court judge and/or jury based on the evidence
presented. The role of the trial judge (and the jury in some details) is to assess the
credibility of documentary evidence and oral testimony. This assessment leads to an
accounting of what ‘really’ happened, even though in litigation, there are by definition
4 We examined the acknowledgements section in 197 publications authored by Michael Mullan accessible in
the SCOPUS database (http://www.scopus.com) from 1992 to 2014. We found no record of acknowledge-
ment of the Alzheimer’s Institute of America or its principals. On the other hand, Mr andMrs Roskamp and
their research foundationwere acknowledged in a substantial numberof publicationsdating from1995.Other
funding came from pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies, state and federal funding agencies, disease
foundations, and the US Government.
5 SeeMayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Lab., 566 U.S. 10 (2012); Association forMolecular Pathol-
ogy v. Myriad Genetics, 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013); Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010); Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd.
v. CLS Bank Intern., 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014). But see also infra note 223 on fee-shifting and injunctions.
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multiple sides to the story.6 Appendix 1 presents a graphic chronology of the key events
in the story.
ALZHEIMER’S DISEASE: FACTS AND FIGURES
Late Onset Alzheimer’s Disease (LOAD) is the most common form of dementia.7 By
2025, it is expected that 7.1 million people over 65 years of age will be affected in the
USA. The health stakes are high, and so is the prospect of profit from effective drugs
to treat or prevent Alzheimer’s disease.8 The associated economic burden for patients,
their families, and society is staggering; current costs to the healthcare system exceed
$200 billion annually.9 LOAD is caused by a combination of genetic and environmen-
tal risk factors. There are at least ten genes that account for half of the genetic risk for
Alzheimer’s, including variants of the APOE gene.10 The ε4 allele of APOE has the
strongest association with LOAD,11 the physiological features of which are the accu-
mulationof the protein fragment beta-amyloid (plaques) in the brain and tangles inside
neurons made up of the protein tau.
Early Onset Alzheimer’s Disease (EOAD), on the other hand, accounts for only a
few per cent of cases and begins before the age of 65.12 EOAD runs in families with
an autosomal dominant inheritance pattern and is caused by one or more mutations
on any of the genes for: the amyloid precursor protein (APP gene, chromosome 21),
the presenilin 1 protein (PSEN1 gene, chromosome 14), or the presenilin 2 protein
(PSEN2 gene, chromosome1).Mutations in these genes cause the disease and account
for 16, 66, and 18 per cent of early-onset cases, respectively.13 The race to identify these
genes is one focus of this paper.
6 The key facts are laid out in two decisions by Judge Savage of the US District Court, East District,
Pennsylvania: Alzheimer’s Inst. of America, Inc. v. Avid Radiopharmaceuticals, No. 10-6908, 2011 WL
3875341 (E.D., Pa. Aug. 31, 2011), http://www.paed.uscourts.gov/documents/opinions/11d0989p.pdf
(accessed Dec. 22, 2014); Alzheimer’s Inst. of America, Inc. v. Avid Radiopharmaceuticals, 952 F.
Supp. 2d 740, 2013 WL 3305738 (E.D. Pa. 2013), http://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/
pennsylvania/paedce/2:2010cv06908/398886/345 (accessed Dec. 23, 2014).
7 Alzheimer’s Association, Major Milestones in Alzheimer’s and Brain Research (2014), http://www.alz.org/
research/science/major˙milestones˙in˙alzheimers.asp (accessed Dec. 11, 2014): the greatest risk factor for
developing Alzheimer’s disease is age, with a lifetime risk of developing Alzheimer’s estimated at 26.3, 28.7,
and 32.4 per cent for individuals over the age of 65, 75, and 85, respectively. Its symptoms are progressive,
startingwith difficulty remembering conversations, names and events andmoving to impairments in commu-
nication, disorientation, confusion, poor judgment, and behavior changes. Eventually, these lead to difficulty
in speaking, swallowing, and walking.
8 Id.
9 Medicines in Development, Biopharmaceutical Research Companies Are Developing Nearly 75 Medicines
for Alzheimer’s Disease, at 1–12 (2013), http://www.phrma.org/sites/default/files/Alzheimer%
27s%202013.pdf (accessed Dec. 22, 2014) [hereinafter,Medicines in Development] .
10 Nilufer E. -Taner, Alzheimer Disease: The Quest for Alzheimer Disease Genes - Focus on SCF Tau, 9 NAT. REV.
NEUROL. 368, 368–79 (2013).
11 Allen D. Roses, On the Discovery of the Genetic Association of Apolipoprotein E Genotypes and Common Late-
Onset Alzheimer Disease, 9 J ALZHEIMER’S DIS. 361, 366 (2006).Those who inherit two copies of the ε4 allele
have an odds ratio of 16 relative to the population; but presence of one or two copies of the allele is neither
necessary nor fully predictive of the development of Alzheimer’s disease.
12 The average age of onset is 52 years, with a range of onset from 40–75 years. The age of onset of Alzheimer’s
for both PSEN genes is earlier if also associated with the APOE ε4 allele.
13 Indeed, only about 30known familiesworldwidehavemutations in theAPP gene, locatedon chromosome21.
TheAPP gene contains at least 30mutations that cause EOAD in individuals from 39 to 67 years of age.There
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Alzheimer’s disease was first described in 1906 by German physician Dr Alois
Alzheimer.14 The dominant explanation for its cause is the amyloid cascade hypoth-
esis.15 This hypothesis suggests that the central event in Alzheimer’s disease pathology
is the deposition in the brain of amyloid-β , a fragment of a transmembrane protein,
APP.Nevertheless, the correlationbetweendementia or other cognitive alterations and
amyloid-β accumulation in the brain in the form of amyloid plaques is not linear, and
mutations in multiple genes are likely involved.16
Despite decades of research and billions of dollars of investment, no therapies have
been approved by regulatory agencies that slow or stop the course of either the early- or
late-onset forms. Approved therapies, of which there are five, ameliorate symptoms in
some patients.17 In 2013, there were 65 clinical trials for new therapeutic approaches,
the vast majority in early phases I and II.18
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Hunt for the first gene for EOAD
The field of Alzheimer’s genetics during the heyday of gene hunting was highly com-
petitive, described as ‘a mixture of idealism, selfishness, generosity, greed, fun, anger,
sex, drugs and rock ‘n’ roll’.19 The key prize for the competitive teams was high-impact
are about 173 pathogenicmutations of PSEN1, located on chromosome 14. Individuals with thesemutations
have severe clinical symptoms with onset between 28 and 64 years of age (average age of onset is 45 years).
ThePSEN1 gene,whichhas 14pathogenicmutations,was found inAmericandescendants ofGerman families
that had previously settled in the Volga River region of Russia.Thesemutations have only been discovered in
this one familial group.
14 Alzheimer’s Association, supra note 7.
15 Eg Eric Karran & John Hardy, Antiamyloid Therapy for Alzheimer’s Disease - Are We on the Right Road?, 370
NEWENG. J.MED. 377, 378 (2014); Eric Karran et al.,TheAmyloid Cascade Hypothesis for Alzheimer’s Disease:
An Appraisal for the Development ofTherapeutics, 10 NAT. REV. DRUG DISC. 698, 698–712 (2011).
16 Intermediary forms of the peptide possibly account for the neurotoxicity of the amyloid-β peptide, suggesting
that mutations in other enzymes that clear amyloid- β or cleave APP might also be involved. For example,
the APOE ε4 isoform of apolipoprotein that breaks down amyloid-β is less efficient than other isoforms. In
addition, a specific fragment called N-APP, which is adjacent to amyloid- β and is cleaved from APP by the
same enzymes, triggers neuronal death and complements amyloid- β that depresses synaptic function.
17 From 1998 to 2011, there were 101 drugs in clinical trials, but only three new medicines were approved
to treat symptoms of Alzheimer’s disease, not its underlying pathophysiology (Medicines in Development,
supra note 9, at 1). In total, the US Food and Drug Administration has approved five medications to treat
the symptoms of Alzheimer’s disease: tacrine (Cognex; 1993); donepezil (Aricept; 1996), rivatigmine (Ex-
celon; 2000), galantamine (Razadyne; 2001); and memantine (Namenda; 2003). Donepezil is indicated
for all stages of the disease, memantine for moderate to severe stages, and the rest for mild to moder-
ate Alzheimer’s disease. Alzheimer’s Association, What We Know today About Alzheimer’s Disease, 2014,
http://www.alz.org/research/science/alzheimers˙disease˙treatments.asp (accessed Dec. 16, 2014).
18 Such novel approaches include targeting of upstream pathways, gene therapy to restore neuronal function,
boosting immune responses with vaccine treatments, prevention of plaque formation, and inhibition of
amyloid-β production (Medicines in Development, supra note 9, at 2).
19 RUDOLPH E. TANZI & ANN B. PARSON, DECODING DARKNESS: THE SEARCH FOR THE GENETIC CAUSES OF
ALZHEIMER’SDISEASE177(2000). (Citing JohnHardy).Another genehunt illustrativeof thedegreeof compe-
tition in the field at the timewas the hunt for the EOADgene on chromosome14.The linkage to chromosome
14 was simultaneously published by the Schellenberg team in Science (Gerard D. Shellenberg et al., Genetic
Linkage Evidence for a Familial Alzheimer’s Disease Locus on Chromosome 14, 258 SCIENCE 668, 671 (1992))
and by three teams in three papers inNature Genetics (MikeMullan et al., A Pathogenic Mutation for Probable
Alzheimer’s Disease in the APP Gene at the N-terminus of β–amyloid, 2 NAT. GENET. 345, 347 (1992); Peter
St George-Hyslop et al., Genetic Evidence for a Novel Familial Alzheimer’s Disease Locus on Chromosome 14, 2
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publications, predominantly in Science and Nature. According to those engaged in
the races for the Alzheimer’s genes, patents were secondary to scientific priority. The
prospect of commercial gain was considered, but not dominant. Autobiographies from
the era describe shifting allegiances and collaborations among research groups, espe-
cially with respect to the biological samples shared.20 Some researchers had close rela-
tionships with members of the families studied and their clinicians.21
In 1984, Dr John A. Hardy headed a research team at St Mary’s Hospital Medical
School in London that was searching for the genetic basis of Alzheimer’s disease. In
1988, StMary’s Hospital merged with Imperial College, at which timeMichaelMullan
joined Prof. Hardy’s team as a Clinical Research Fellow. He received a Ph.D. in 1993.
TheHardy teamwas one ofmany, internationally, that was seeking the gene(s) respon-
sible for EOAD. Also in the hunt were multiple groups in the USA, Europe, Japan, and
Australia. This research depended on clinical diagnosis of Alzheimer’s disease, biolog-
ical samples from the patients and other family members, and detailed pedigrees.22 In
pedigrees of 4000 knowndescendants with sixty known cases of the disease, it was clear
that EOADwas caused by a genetic mutation.
Two key lines of evidence directed the hunt toward chromosome 21. First, individ-
uals with Down syndrome, caused by an extra copy of chromosome 21, accumulate
an amyloid protein similar in structure to individuals with Alzheimer’s disease.23 In
NAT. GENET. 330, 334 (1992); Christine Van Broeckhoven et al.,Mapping of a gene predisposing to early-onset
Alzheimer’s disease to chromosome 14q24.3, 2 NAT. GENET. 335, 339 (1992). According to TANZI & PARSON,
supra note 19, at 151, there were rumors of piggybacking given the timing of the papers. Van Broeckhoven
claimed that she first identified the linkage but was waiting to identify the gene. Hearing of the other papers,
she raced to print. However, ‘the most rumor-driven collision was between Hyslop and the Hardy-Mullan
team’ (TANZI & PARSON, supra note 19, at 152). St George-Hsylop’s paper was submitted toNature and sent
to theHardy/Mullan team, among others, for review.They faulted it on the basis of St George-Hyslop’s prior
linkage in the same families to chromosome 21; it was highly unlikely that the individuals carried two muta-
tions.Nature rejected the paper ‘andHyslop, rumor had it, felt thatHardy andMullan had delayed his paper’s
publication for the sake of completing their own chromosome 14 paper’ (TANZI & PARSON, supra note 19, at
152).Three years later, however, St George Hyslop led the team that cloned the presenilin gene on chromo-
some 14, winning a tight race with the Tanzi, Schellenberg, and the Hardy/Van Broeckhoven teams(Robin
Sherrington et al., Cloning of a gene bearing missense mutations in early-onset familial Alzheimer’s disease, 375
NAT. GENET. 754, 760 (1995)).
20 Id. and DANIEL A. POLLEN, HANNAH’S HEIRS: THEQUEST FOR THEGENETICORIGINS OF ALZHEIMER’S DISEASE
(EXP. SUB. ED. 1996) (1993).
21 Id.
22 Id. For example, Peter St George-Hyslop, then a Ph.D. student with JamesGusella at theMassachusettsGen-
eral Hospital, had access to a growing collection of samples of Alzheimer’s families. Initially he focused on a
British Canadian family, described by Linda Nee and Ronald Polinsky at the National Institutes of Health in
1983 and a large family of Southern Italian ancestry provided byRickMyers and collected byRobert Feldman
at Boston University. Daniel A. Pollen at the University of Massachusetts University Medical Centre studied
a Russian-American family and, in Seattle, Gerard Schellenberg studied a Volga German family, whose sam-
ples and pedigree had been collected byThomas Bird at the University of Washington. In Europe, Christine
VanBroeckhoven studied Belgian families; Jean-Francois Foncin andV. Supino-Viterbo found a French fam-
ily; and John Hardy’s group had a newly identified British family (Id. at 206). In 1985, combined data from
the French and Italian families and their American descendants showed a common ancestor: Jean Francois
Foncin et al., Demence Presenile d’Alzheimer Tranmise Dans Unie Famille Etendue, 141 REVUE NEUROLOGIC
194, 194–202 (1985).
23 George G. Glenner & Caine W. Wong, Alzheimer’s Disease: Initial Report of the Purification and Character-
ization of a Novel Cerebrovascular Amyloid Protein, 122 BIOCHEM. BIOPHYS. RES. COMMUN. 1131, 1131–35
(1984). Accumulation occurs in the walls of small cerebral blood vessels. Individuals with Down syndrome
also display ‘senile plaques’ in their brains.
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addition, Rudolph Tanzi24 was constructing a linkage map of chromosome 21, mak-
ing it a particularly inviting target for etiological research.25 Despite the evidence, how-
ever, initial testing of linkage of EOAD tomarkers for Down syndrome was negative.26
But, further testing in some families27 showed a genetic linkage to a different region
that contained the APP gene.28 In 1987, four papers were published almost simultane-
ously that mapped theAPP gene to chromosome 21 and sequenced portions29 or all of
the gene.30 Unfortunately, later that year, researchers found no linkage between any of
the Alzheimer’s families and the APP gene.31 Thus, the hope for a quick answer for the
cause of Alzheimer’s in the spring rapidly began to evaporate by September of the same
year.32
At the same time, researchers at the University of Leiden in the Netherlands had
shared samples of families with a rare condition known as theDutch disease.33 In 1990,
two groups linked the disease to the APP gene.34 This evidence inspired Hardy’s team
to check its EOAD samples for mutations in the same region on chromosome 21. His
team found a mutation close to the Dutch disease mutation35 in samples from a small
British family36, and the samemutation in a second family’s samples that they received
fromDrAllenRoses,37 samples onwhichDrRoses had found a linkage to chromosome
24 Rudolf Tanzi was then a Ph.D. student in the lab of Dr James Gusella at theMassachusetts General Hospital.
25 TANZI & PARSON, supra note 19, at 49–59. Chromosome 21 is the shortest autosomal human chromosome.
26 Peter St George Hyslop, supra note 22.
27 Especially in a large Italian family.
28 The linkage to this region close to the centromere on Chromosome 21 that contained the APP gene was cal-
culated with a significant LOD score for genetic linkage. St George-Hyslop et al.The Genetic Defect Causing
Familial Alzheimer’s DiseaseMaps onChromosome 21. 235 SCIENCE 885, 885–90 (1987). LOD stands for loga-
rithm of the odds. It is ‘a statistical estimate of whether two genes, or a gene and a disease gene, are likely to be
located near each other on a chromosome and are therefore likely to be inherited. A LOD score of 3 or higher
is generally understood to mean that two genes are located close to each other on the chromosome. In terms
of significance, a LOD score of 3 means that the odds are a thousand to one that the two genes are linked,
and therefore inherited together’: Lawrence C. Brody, National Human Genome Research Institute. Talking
Glossary of Genetic Terms, http://www.genome.gov/Glossary/index.cfm?id=531 (accessed Dec. 18, 2014).
29 TANZI & PARSON, supra note 19, at 49–59 and Dmitry Goldgaber et al., Characterization and Chromosomal
Localization of a cDNA Encoding Brain Amyloid of Alzheimer’s Disease, 235 SCIENCE 877, 877–80 (1987) .
30 Jie Kang et al.,The Precursor of Alzheimer’s Disease Amyloid A4 Protein Resembles a Cell-Surface Receptor, 325
NATURE 733, 733–36 (1987).
31 Peter St George-Hyslop, supra note 22. St George-Hyslop was at Massachusetts General Hospital; Christine
Van Broeckhoven et al., Failure of Familial Alzheimer’s Disease to Segregate with the A4-Amyloid Gene in Sev-
eral European Families, 329 NATURE 153,155 (1987). Van Broeckhoven and colleagues were at University of
Antwerp, Belgium.
32 POLLEN, supra note 20, at 153.
33 Hereditary cerebral hemorrhage with amyloidosis of the Dutch type. The Dutch disease causes a sim-
ilar plaque buildup to Alzheimer’s, but in the brain vasculature: Orphanet, Hereditary cerebral hemor-
rhage with amyloidosis, Dutch type, http://www.orpha.net/consor/cgi-bin/OC˙Exp.php?Expert=100006
(accessed Dec. 22, 2014).
34 The two teamswere ledbyChristineVanBroeckhoven andBlasFrangioneofNewYorkUniversity. Frangione
sequenced the nucleotide substitution, locating it on exon 17. Efrat Levy et al., Mutation of the Alzheimer’s
Disease Amyloid Gene in Hereditary Cerebral Hemorrhage, Dutch Type. 248 SCIENCE 1124, 1124–26 (1990);
Christine V. Broeckhoven et al.Amyloid Beta Protein Precursor Gene andHereditary Cerebral Hemorrhage with
Amyloidosis (Dutch), 248 SCIENCE 1120, 1120–22 (1990).
35 Approximately 70 base pairs from the Dutch disease mutation.
36 Marie-Christine Chartier-Harlin et al., Early-Onset Alzheimer’s Disease Caused by Mutations at Codon 717 of
the Beta-Amyloid Precursor Protein Gene, 353 NATURE 844, 844–46 (1991).
37 Allen Roses fromDuke University was best-known for identifying the APOE gene.
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21. However, no samples from the other 22 families kept by Hardy’s group carried the
mutation. His team published this first Alzheimer’s mutation in the APP gene in Na-
ture.38 This paper was the first to link a genetic mutation with the molecular basis of
Alzheimer’s disease and became themost cited publication in the biomedical literature
in 1991.39 The paper was not merely famous, but infamous as well, causing great con-
troversy in the Alzheimer’s research community for omitting Roses as a co-author.40
Science Watch labeled research on the APP gene as the ‘hottest corner of biology’.41
Themutation became known as the ‘London mutation’.
After the publication of the London mutation, teams around the world looked for
the mutation in their EOAD families. One was found in France and three in Japan, but
themutation was obviously rare.42 Indeed, in the end it became obvious that the initial
publication by St George-Hyslop claiming linkage to chromosome 21 was wrong. As
explained by Tanzi inDecoding Darkness:
because of Hyslop’s finding that hinted at something amiss on chromosome 21, John
Hardy’s lab had determined it too had a family linked to chromosome 21. Yet while the
original [MassachusettsGeneralHospital] data turnedout to be false 43, theHardy team’s
linkage to chromosome 21 was the originally suspected APP gene! “It was a bizarre co-
nundrum that the original linkage report fromMass General was wrong”. Recounts John
Hardy, “Bizarre, because it was wrong in the right place”. 44
Commercialization of the Londonmutation
At this point in the narrative, issues of commercialization begin to enter the story, set-
ting the stage for later discovery of the Swedish (APPswe)mutation.Thefindings of fact
in the litigation start at this point, with the discovery of the London mutation.45 Judge
Savage of the US District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania outlined the
history of the London mutation because this negative experience impacted Hardy and
Mullan’s subsequent commercialization endeavors.46
In January 1992, the Imperial College of Science, Technology and Medicine filed
for a US patent that claimed the nucleic acid sequence encoding a codon 717 mutant
of human APP 770 and associated cDNA and cell lines.47 The patent listed Hardy and
Mullan, along withMarie-Christine Chartier-Harlin, AlisonGoate, andMichael Owen
as inventors. According to Judge Savage, technology transfer officers at Imperial Ex-
ploitation Limited (‘IMPEL’) erroneously advised the team that UK law prohibited
38 Chartier-Harlin, supra note 36.
39 POLLEN, supra note 20, at 213.
40 TANZI & PARSON, supra note 19, at 120.
41 Id. at 135. See also POLLEN, supra note 20, at 213.
42 Most large groups did not find the mutation, including the group at Massachusetts General Hospital and
Schellenberg’s group in Seattle.
43 In this context, ‘false’ means that the conclusions drawn from the data were incorrect, not that the data were
deliberately falsified.
44 TANZI&PARSON, supra note 19, at 129. But Tanzi’s use of the term ‘false’ is not intended to imply fabrication,
but rather that the data turned out not to determine linkage between mutations on Chromosome 21 and
Alzheimer’s disease.
45 Alzheimer’s Inst. of America, 2011WL 3875341, supra note 6, at 2.
46 Id.
47 US Patent No. 5877,015 (filed Jan. 21, 1992).
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the patenting of transgenic animals and, so the patent did not claim transgenic animal
models.
After the filing, Athena Neurosciences, a San Francisco-based biotechnology com-
pany, approached Imperial, through Hardy, ‘to sponsor the team’s research on new
APP mutations’.48 This resulted in a Sponsored Research Agreement in August 1991.
‘Athena then redrafted the US patent application to include transgenic animals carry-
ing the Londonmutation.The agreement granted Athena exclusive rights tomutation-
carrying transgenic animals and to any subsequent Alzheimer’s discoveries from the
laboratory. Upon learning that IMPEL had given them erroneous advice, the research
team was disappointed with the deal they had made with Athena.’49 Imperial rejected
Hardy and Mullan’s attempt to renegotiate their interest in the patent because under
the U.K. Patents Act, 1977, inventions made during the normal course of employment
vested in the employer, not the employee.50
The dispute with Imperial over the patenting and licensing of the Londonmutation
was part of the impetus for the researchers to leave Imperial, and warm to recruitment
by the University of South Florida (USF), which was enticing them with financial and
research incentives. Ronald Sexton, a Kansas City businessman and venture capitalist
who became central to the ensuing litigation over the Swedish mutation, actively en-
couraged the move. By the end of 1991, Mullan had relocated to Florida to set up the
Alzheimer’s research laboratory to be headed by Hardy; his employment there began
onDecember 16, 1991.Mullan later claimed that themovewas due to the poor funding
environment for Alzheimer’s research in theUK, even thoughUSFwas ‘not necessarily
one of the top places’.51
DISCOVERY OF THE SWEDISH MUTATION AND THE KEY
PROTAGONISTS
Thediscovery of the Londonmutation triggered other researchers to screen their sam-
ples for mutations in the region of Exon 17. Dr Lars Lannfelt, then working with Dr
Bengt Winblad at the Karolinska Institute in Sweden, was collecting samples from
Swedish families with a hereditary pattern of EOAD. In February 1992, Lannfelt vis-
ited Hardy in London with pedigrees and samples from two of his families. Hardy in-
structedoneof his students,HenryHoulden, to test theDNAfor linkage againstmarker
GT12 near APP on chromosome 21.The linkage analysis found a strong likelihood of
a mutation on the APP gene in both Swedish families.52 Hardy then sent the samples
of the affected and unaffected members of the Swedish families toMullan for sequenc-
ing in Florida to check for mutations on Exons 16 and 17.53 This action contradicted
48 Alzheimer’s Inst. of America, 2011WL 3875341, supra note 6, at 4.
49 Id.
50 UK Patents Act, 1977, c. 37, § 39.
51 Catherine Hollingsworth, Archer Pharma Working on New Version of AD Drug, BIOWORLD TODAY, 2009,
at 8., http://www.bioworld.com/content/archer-pharma-working-new-version-ad-drug (accessed Dec. 22,
2014).
52 Alzheimer’s Inst. of America, 2011WL 3875341, supra note 6, at 3.
53 Id.; Alzheimer’s Inst. Of America, 2013WL 3305738, supra note 6, at 3.
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Lannfelt’s understanding, stated in an interview, that the sequencing was to be divided
between the teams, with Exon 16 to be sequenced in Florida and Exon 17 in Sweden.54
When the samples arrived in Florida, Mullan confirmed the linkage. Without con-
sulting Hardy, Mullan instructed Fiona Crawford, another member of the Hardy team
who had moved to Florida, to sequence Exons 16 and 17 ‘at an off-campus labora-
tory at the Tampa Bay Research Institute (‘TBRI’) instead of in the USF laboratory’.55
The sequencing confirmed a doubleAPP genemutation affecting codons 670 and 671.
The results were published in Nature Genetics in 1992 with Mullan as the correspond-
ing author using his USF affiliation.56 Also included among the authors on the pa-
per were Winblad and Lannfelt from the Karolinska Institute, Houlden from Imperial
College, and Fiona Crawford from USF. Notably absent as co-author (and even from
the acknowledgements), however, was Hardy, becauseMullan and Hardy ‘agreed that
Hardy’s name would not be included on any publication related to the Swedish muta-
tion’.57 In addition, the only funding sources acknowledged on the paper are Swedish:
the SwedishMedical Research Council and the Tore Nilson Fund. Other publications
from the Mullan-Hardy team between 1991 and 1993 cited support from the Medi-
cal Research Council, the Wellcome Trust, and a variety of disease charities, among
others.58
According to the judge and jury that sifted through trial documents and testimony,
the sequencing was structured deliberately to avoid ownership claims by Imperial Col-
lege.59 Indeed, Judge Savage concluded: ‘Having the sequencing done in Florida rather
than in London could have been seen by the jury as nothing more than a step in the
furtherance of the conspiracy to avoid the inventions becoming the property of Impe-
rial College or Athena’.60 Leaving Hardy’s name off the publications seems consistent
with this conclusion as well. At the time, Hardy was still employed at Imperial College,
and bothMullan and Crawford were still Ph.D. students.61 Imperial College, like most
universities, required disclosures of inventions by staff and students; it also required
assignment of ownership rights.62 Such disclosure and assignment were not made.
54 Esther Landhuis,Court Ruling Sinks APPswe Patent Suit Claims,ALZFORUM 2012, http://www.alzforum.org/
news/community-news/court-ruling-sinks-appswe-patent-suit-claims (accessed Dec. 22, 2014).
55 Alzheimer’s Inst. of America, 2011WL 3875341, supra note 6, at 5, 6.
56 Mullan et al., supra note 19.
57 Alzheimer’s Inst. of America, 2011WL 3875341, supra note 6, at 3.
58 Publications co-authored by Mullan from 1989 to 1995 and listed in PubMed identified the following fund-
ing sources: The Medical Research Council; The Mental Health Foundation; Research into Ageing; The
Foundation for Age Research;The Royal Society; Merck Sharpe and Dohme Ltd; Wellcome Trust; NATO;
Alzheimer’s Disease Society; The IPSEN Foundation; The Royal Society; and Athena Neuroscience. Other
funding sources were the Howard Hughes Medical Institute which supported the work of co-author L. Jan
at the University of California San Francisco. Swedish source of funding came from the SwedishMedical Re-
search Council and Tore Nilson’s Fund.Work in 1995 acknowledged the Texas Department of Health DNA
bank for genetics studies of Alzheimer’s disease and Robert Roskamp.
59 Alzheimer’s Inst. of America , 2013WL 3305738, supra note 6.
60 Id. at 4.
61 Mullan and Crawford received their Ph.D. degrees in 1993 and 1994, respectively.
62 Imperial College current IP policy states: the Patents Act 1977 and the Copyright, Designs and Patents
Act 1988, with any related IP legislation, make it clear that all forms of IP generated by an employee,
made in the course of the employee’s normal duties, belong to their employer. Hence, as prescribed by
law, any IP created by College employees in the course of their normal duties shall be the property of
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Indeed,Mullan claimed that he was not a student at Imperial College in 1992 although
he was still working on his dissertation at that time.63
In 1992, Mullan, Hardy, and Sexton engaged a UK law firm, Clyde & Co., to draft a
letter to USF asking for a waiver of any rights USF may have to any ‘inventions made
by them, whether before or after the date of the letter’, which would include any rights
in the Swedish mutation.64 The USF President of Research, Dr George R. Newkome,
signed the letter onMay 4, 1992, but changed the language to ‘before August 15, 1992’.
However, the letter did not specifically make reference to the Swedishmutation, which
was discovered while Mullan was already employed at USF, and USF’s knowledge of
this discovery was disputed years later, during the litigation.
A day after the letter was signed by all parties, Sexton incorporated the AIA as a
Florida for-profit corporation onMay 5, 1992, for ‘the purpose of holding and exploit-
ing the rights to the Swedish mutation’.65 AIA issued its first annual report in 1993,
naming Sexton as President andMullan as Vice President and treasurer.
Following the publication on the Swedish mutation, Mullan sought US patent pro-
tection as sole inventor (seeTable 1).Thefirst patent applicationwas filed in June 1992
and a patent issued in October 1995.66 A second patent application, also namingMul-
lan as sole inventor, was filed in March 1997 and granted in August 1998, claiming the
polypeptide of theAPPproteinwith the Swedishmutation (Table 1). Finally, inMarch
2007,Mullan filed another continuation application claiming transgenicmice that con-
tained the APPswe mutation, again as sole inventor. That third patent was granted in
May 2009, fully 17 years after the initial patent application was filed.67 The third patent
claimed transgenic mice carrying the Swedish mutation as well as screening methods
for an Alzheimer’s therapeutic agent using such mice (see Table 1). Mullan assigned
his rights in these patents to AIA.
In 1993, the relationship between Hardy and Mullan became strained.68 In De-
coding Darkness, Tanzi quoted Mullan as stating that he had ‘privately patented’ the
Swedish mutation ‘because I’d found it, and because [Hardy] hadn’t been convinced
the Swedish family even had a mutation’.69 According to Tanzi, Hardy inadvertently
came across correspondence between Mullan and a California biotechnology com-
pany about commercially available mice with the Swedishmutation.WhileMullan dis-
puted that the correspondence was about the Swedish mutation, commercialization
endeavours and the US research environment drove a wedge between Hardy and
College. (See Imperial College, Intellectual Property Policy, Jul. 15, 2009, https://workspace.imperial.ac.uk/
researchservices/Public/College%20IP%20Policy%20public%20access.pdf (accessed Dec. 19, 2014).
63 Alzheimer’s Inst. of America , 2011WL 3875341, supra note 6.
64 Id. at 6.
65 Id. at 4.
66 US Patent No. 5455,169 (filed Jun. 4, 1992). It claimed the nucleic acid of the human amyloid precursor
protein comprising the Swedish mutation, a vector that includes the Swedish mutation and an immortalized
mammalian cell line that contains the Swedish mutation.
67 US Patent No. 7538,258 (filedMar. 8, 2007) [hereinafter ‘258 patent’]. A continuation patent uses the same
disclosure specification as the initial or parent application, claims the priority date of the parent patent, and
generally names at least one of the same inventors. It is often used when an applicant feels he/she has not
claimed all of the different embodiments of the invention in the parent patent. See discussion on strategic
issuance delay, infra note 205, at 298–301.
68 TANZI & PARSON, supra note 19, at 162.
69 Id at 163.
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Table 1. AIA litigation related patents namingMichaelMullan as inventor andAIA as
assignee. Note that all patents claimed the June 4, 1992 priority date.
Patent number Title Subject matter
Filed/
Published





Claims (1) the nucleic acid of the
human APP with asparagine at
codon 670 and/or leucine at
codon 671, or a fragment of the
protein; (2) a further
specification about the amino
acid at codon 717; (3) a vector
that includes the nucleic acid;
and (4) an immortalized
mammalian cell line that contains
the nucleic acid in question.
1992-06-04/
1995-10-03
US 5,795,963 APP in
Alzheimer’s
disease
Claims the purified and isolated
polypeptide of human APP that
includes codons 670 and 671,
where asparagine is at codon 670
and/or leucine is at codon 671.
1997-03-13/
1998-08-18





Claims (1) an isolated (and
immortalized) cell with a nucleic
acid encoding a human APP that
includes codons 670 and 671,
operable linked to a promoter.
The nucleic acid encodes an
amino acid other than lysine at
codon 670 and/or an amino acid
other than methionine at codon
671.The cell expresses the human
APP or a fragment of it; (2) the
same claim that includes codon
717, with an amino acid other
than valine; and (3) a method of
screening for an agent for treating
Alzheimer’s disease that involves
contacting the claimed cell with
an agent and monitoring the
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Table 1Continued.








Claims (1a) a transgenic mouse
whose genome comprises a
nucleic acid encoding human
APP including codons 670 and
671, operably linked to a
promoter, where the amino acid
at codon 670 is not lysine and/or
the amino acid at 671 is not
methionine and the mouse
expresses this protein or a
fragment of it; (b) a transgenic
mouse that has an amino acid
other than valine at codon 717;
and (c) the mouse forms
amyloidogenic aggregates in its
brain and/or exhibits Alzheimer’s
disease pathology; and (2) a
method of screening for an agent
for treating Alzheimer’s disease
through contacting the mouse
with an agent and monitoring the
expression, processing or




Mullan70 to the point thatHardybecame a keydefensewitness againstMullan’s patents
in later litigation.
Within a decade, both Hardy and Mullan had left the Department of Psychiatry at
USF. Hardy accepted a position in 1997 at the Mayo Clinic in Jacksonville, Florida,
where he collaborated with SmithKline Beecham and the Institute for Genome Re-
search.71 Mullan moved to the Roskamp Institute, off campus in Sarasota, the home
of Robert Roskamp, a ‘businessman and USF benefactor who contributed $5 million
to set up the center’.72 Mullan resigned fromUSF in January 2003 ‘after a USF investi-
gation concluded that he had sexually harassed one woman and created ‘a serious risk’
of violating university policies in his pursuit of personal relationshipswithwomen in his
lab’.73 Nature News reported that Mullan, after resigning fromUSF, filed a civil lawsuit
for defamation against the former USF researcher he had allegedly harassed in 1997.74
70 Id.
71 Id.
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TheRoskamp Institute was set up as a non-profit organization in 2003, and its web-
site stated that it was affiliated with the AIA.75 Until 2003, the Roskamp Institute was
part of the USF, and in 2009, Mullan became its executive director; it spun out Archer
Pharmaceuticals in 2008 with Mullan as chief executive officer and chief scientific of-
ficer, and with Fiona Crawford as associate chief scientific officer.76 The company spe-
cialized in targeted drug discovery for Alzheimer’s disease. Archer Pharmaceuticals was
also listed as a collaborator in early trials of nilvadipine in Europe that Trinity College
led, beginning in 2006.77
At Roskamp, Mullan continued his relationship with Ronald Sexton and the AIA,
located in Kansas City, Kansas, as well as with its affiliated charitable AIA Foundation
located in Sarasota, Florida. These two entities had similar names, with one for-profit
and the other non-profit. The Directors of AIA were listed as Sexton and Marjorie E.
Curran. Those of the non-profit AIA Foundation, founded in 2010,78 were listed as
Michael Mullan, Brian Sexton, and Jamison Sexton (now at Roche Diagnostics). Ac-
cording to separate websites for both entities, partnering organizations included the
Roskamp Institute, the Green-Field Library, and Archer Pharmaceuticals prior toMay
29, 2011.TheAIAwebsite listed the Swedishmutation patents among its holdings, but
containedno information on commercial or academic licensing opportunities.The cur-
rent website links for licensing the APPswe patents from AIA are inactive.79
Summary of research on theAPP gene
The history of research on the APP gene and the relative contributions over time to
the field are illustrated in Figures 1 and 2. Figure 1 shows linkages by co-authorship of
publication on the APP gene up to the end of the 1990s, with the bulk of research pa-
pers on the genes generated by researchers at the University of Heidelberg, Germany
(the Konrad Beyreuther— Gerhard Multhaup—Colin Masters cluster). Other cen-
tral groups are led by Frangione, van Broeckhoven, andHardy. Hardy’s group includes
his students—Mullan, Crawford, and Houlden—and links to Dr Alan Roses and two
Swedish researchers,Drs BengtWinblad andLars Lannfelt.TheGusella group includes
St George-Hyslop and Tanzi. The research communities (differentiated by color) in
this graph have limited connectivity, illustrating the competition between the separate
teams in the 1990s thatwere racing to find and characterizemutations on theAPP gene.
75 Roskamp Institute, Scientific Research at the Roskamp Institute, http://www.rfdn.org/ (accessed Dec. 12,
2014).
76 Hollingsworth, supra note 51, at 8.
77 The company is listed as a collaborator in a phase III human clinical trial for the re-purposing of the blood
pressure drug Nilvadipine, sponsored by researchers at Trinity College Institute of Neuroscience, Dublin,
Ireland (recruiting 2013, NCT02017340; clinicaltrials.gov). The Trinity College trial is the only clinical
trial that lists Archer Pharmaceuticals as Collaborator (or Sponsor) registered on Clinicaltrials.gov.The trial
was funded in 2011 by a Six million Euro grant from the European Commission’s Framework Seven Pro-
gramme. SharonCampbell,Clinical Trials for NewAlzheimer’s Disease Treatment Led by Trinity College Dublin
Researchers to be Awarded European Commission €6 million Funding, 29 May 2011, https://www.tcd.ie/
Communications/news/pressreleases/pressRelease.php?headerID=1856&pressReleaseArchive=2011, (ac-
cessed Dec. 23, 2014).
78 Guidestar, 2014, ‘Alzheimer’s Institute of America’, http://www2.guidestar.org/ (accessed Dec. 11, 2014).
79 Alzheimer’s Institute of America Inc., Supporting Brain Research Worldwide, 2009, http://www.
alzheimersinstitute.com/ (accessed Dec. 11, 2014).
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Figure 1. Co-authorship of 145 publications on the APP gene prior to 2000.80
Colors indicate clusters of individuals who published together. Linkages (co-authorship)
between authors are indicated with lines.The size of the circle indicates the relative number
of publications attributed to an author. We added author names for those who (1) had a large
number of papers, (2) were central in linking two groups, (3) were illustrative of a grouping,
and/or (4) were central actors in patenting mutations in the APP gene.
In the 2000s (Figure 2), the field became more widely dispersed. Notably, there
is far more connectivity among the research communities. Colin Masters’ research
80 On Oct. 9, 2014, we searched the NCBI Gene database (National Center for Biotechnology Informa-
tion, http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/gene) for the APP gene. We then selected all 1939 citations in the
PubMed database (US National Library of Medicine, National Institutes of Health, http://www.ncbi.
nlm.nih.gov/pubmed) linked to the APP gene record in the NCBI Gene database. We exported
these in XML format and parsed out the PubMed IDs (unique publication identifiers). We then
searched a second proprietary publication database, SCOPUS (Elsevier, Scopus, http://www.elsevier.
com/online-tools/scopus) for the PubMed IDs, because the data it returns are in a format more amenable
to bibliometric analyses. We constructed a dataset of APP gene publications (n= 1869). We disambiguated
the authors’ names by hand, ensuring that authors did not appear more than once, if, for example, they had
publications using either their first or first and middle initial. We used Gelphi (http://gephi.github.io/) to
visualize the co-authorship linkages and generate the figures. Gelphi uses graph theory to visualize relation-
ships between authors (Mason A. Porter et al., Communities in Networks, 56 NOTICES AM. MATHEMATICAL
SOC’Y 1082 (2009)). It assigns a unique node to each author.The lines between nodes reflect the relationship
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Figure 2. Co-authorship of 1724 publications on the APP gene from 2000 to 2014.81
Colors indicate clusters of individuals who published together. Linkages (co-authorship)
between authors are indicated with lines.The size of the circle indicates the relative number
of publications attributed to an author. We added author names for those who (1) had a large
number of papers, (2) were central in linking two groups; (3) were illustrative of a grouping,
and/or (4) were central actors in patenting mutations in the APP gene.
continued in Australia. Masters also continued collaboration with the German re-
searchers Beyreuther and Multhaup. The Swedish researchers, Lannfelt and Winblad,
increased their publications in the field.Others from the 1990s, such asTanzi andFran-
gione, continued to publish. New clusters of researchers entered the field. Hardy, in
collaboration withGoate, continued with a smaller number of publications on theAPP
gene. However, the researcher who claimed a sole proprietary interest over one key
mutation, Michael Mullan, is notably absent as a co-author on any paper, although he
continued in the field of Alzheimer’s research.
THE LITIGATION
Thepatent lawsuits over Alzheimer’s research, in general, and the Swedishmutation, in
particular, run against perceptions that publicly funded researchers are immune from
between them. Gelphi identifies communities of authors (represented by different colors) using algorithms
that identify discrete groups of nodes with dense connections internally, but sparse connections between
groups (Kyoungok Kim, Improved Churn Prediction In Telecommunication Industry by Analyzing a Large Net-
work. 41 EXPERT SYS. APPLICATIONS 6575 (2014)).
81 Id.We used the same method to generate Figure 2 as Figure 1 with a date range of 2000 to October 2014.
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patent infringement litigation.The central enforcer was AIA, anNPE created to exploit
theSwedishmutationpatents.Defendants includedpharmaceutical andbiotechnology
companies as well as public and private research institutions. In five lawsuits, AIA as-
serted its patents against 18 separate defendants, including one university, one founda-
tion, and three non-profit research organizations.The litigation consumed at least 18.7
cumulative court years in six jurisdictions; engaged at least 98 lawyers on the record
(39 engaged by non-profit research organizations, foundations, and universities); and
entailed 1143 court filings (docket entries) for motions, pleadings, complaints, cer-
tifications, demands, notices, affidavits, stipulations, etc. (Table 2).82 AIA was not
successful in any litigation; all caseswere dismissedwithnodispositive findingof patent
infringement (Table 2).
While protracted and intricate civil litigation without a clear disposition on the
merits is common the USA, it is also a hallmark of patent trolls that sue multiple
practicing entities simultaneously. It should be noted that the structure of US federal
civil litigation is designed to favor private settlement and procedural resolutions over
substantive decisions. This structure favors trolls, whose business model is, in part,
based on extorting royalty payments that are lower than the costs of defending a patent
suit. Avoidance of dispositions on validity of patents likewise benefits trolls, whose
patent holdings likely include someof questionable validity.Here,wepresent a chrono-
logical account of litigation that directly or indirectly involved AIA and its patents over
the Swedish mutation.The patents expired in October 2012.
Alzheimer’s Institute of America, Inc. v.MayoClinic et al.
On December 18, 2003, AIA filed a patent infringement suit against the Mayo Clinic,
Jacksonville, Inc.; the Mayo Foundation for Medical Education and Research; Myriad
Genetics Inc.; and Myriad Pharmaceuticals Inc. asserting the ‘169 nucleic acids and
the ‘963 protein patents.83 The suit was over the use of APPswe-expressing cell lines
that, AIA argued, were not covered under a 1996 license thatMayo obtained fromAIA
for transgenic mice. According to one article, when the case was moved to Florida,84
‘an arbitrator concluded that Mayo was not allowed to use the APPswe cell lines under
the licensing agreement with AIA, and that AIA was not entitled to additional money
for benefitsMayo received through third-party agreements’.85This conclusion kept the
case alive, even though both Mayo and Myriad relied on numerous defenses related
to the validity of the patents, with the issues of inventorship and ownership ultimately
decided in AIA v. Avid, discussed below.86
82 Lex Machina, Data compiled from Lex Machina, https://law.lexmachina.com/cases/15497 (accessed Dec.
23, 2014).
83 Id. LexMachina Results. Alzheimer’s Inst. of America v. Mayo Clinic,No. 03–02645. (2005).
84 AIA filed a motion to seal the complaint due to confidential information, which motion was granted on Dec.
19, 2003 (Pl. Mot. to Seal Compl., No. 03–02645, Dec. 19, 2003). |AIA requested the trial to take place in
Kansas City, the location of its office, and the home of Sexton. After 40 separate docket entries of motions,
filings, orders, pleadings etc. and over a year and a half, the case was transferred from the District of Kansas to
the Middle District of Florida on 6 June 2005 (Alzheimer’s Inst. of America, No. 03–02645, (2005)). There
it accumulated a further 28 docket entries over 7.6 years until it ended.
85 Esther Landhuis & Gabrielle Strobel, Law and Disorder - APPswe Patent Suits Raise Ruckus Again, ALZ-
FORUM 2010, http://www.alzforum.org/news/community-news/law-and-disorder-appswe-patent-suits-
raise-ruckus-again (accessed Dec. 23, 2014).
86 Alzheimer’s Inst. of America , 2011WL 3875341 and , 2013WL 3305738, supra note 6.
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After close to a decade, there was no dispositive outcome on the patent issues at
bar in AIA v Mayo. However, since Mayo agreed to license the transgenic mice patent
carrying the Swedish mutation from AIA,87 it is worth digressing from the main tale to
discuss another patent infringement suit brought by Elan Pharmaceuticals against the
Mayo Foundation, in which the AIA patents played a key evidentiary role. It is also im-
portant tonote that this caseover cell lines contradicts Sexton’s contention thatAIAdid
not sue non-profit research organizations.88 Sexton claimed that AIA’s license toMayo
over transgenicmouse lines facilitated their distribution to the research community and
acted as evidence that AIA’s intent was not to impact Alzheimer’s disease research by
the academic sector.However,AIAcontinued the suitwithMayoover cell lines.To that
extent, AIA was, indeed, enforcing its patents against academic researchers at Mayo.
Sidebar: Elan Pharmaceuticals, Inc. and AthenaNeurosciences, Inc. v.Mayo
Foundation forMedical Education andResearch89
In 1996, Irish pharmaceutical company Elan acquired the California-based Athena
Neuroscience, valued at $630millionUSD.90 AthenaNeurosciences, Inc., was founded
in 1986 and specialized in ‘discovery, development andmarketing of products and ser-
vices to be used primarily by neurologists for the treatment and diagnosis of neuro-
logical disorders’.91 With the acquisition, Elan gained control over the London mu-
tation patents that Imperial College had licensed to Athena Neuroscience, as well as
other Alzheimer’s-related patents.The two patents that Elan asserted against theMayo
Foundation in 1999 were US Patent No. 5,612,486 (‘Transgenic Animals Harboring
APP Allele Having Swedish Mutation’) with a priority date of October 27, 1993 and
US Patent No. 5,850,003 (same title, except ‘Rodents’ substituted for ‘Animals’; same
priority date). The patents claimed rodents with the Swedish mutation that produce
ATF-betaAPP in detectable quantities in mouse brain homogenate. Inventors on the
patents were LisaMcConlogue and Jun Zhao; both were researchers at AthenaNeuro-
sciences and then at Elan. No one on the Hardy team was listed as a co-inventor.
Elan claimed that Mayo infringed its patents by making, using, and selling mice
that overexpress APP. News coverage of the litigation noted concern within the neuro-
science research community about the chilling effect on Alzheimer’s research, which at
the time had few animal models.92 The concern was exacerbated by Elan’s subpoena of
the laboratory notebooks of key researchers, including some who had made their own
transgenicmousemodels.93 More than 50 academic research groups and a dozen phar-
maceutical companies accessedMayo’s transgenic mice, some of which were based on
the work by Karen Hsiao’s team at the University of Minnesota. That group created
87 Dalton, supra note 73.
88 Brian Sexton, (posted Jun 22, 2010), comment in response to Landhuis & Strobel, supra note 83.
89 346 F.3d 1051 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
90 Funding Universe, Elan Corporation PLC History, International Directory of Company Histories, 2004
http://www.fundinguniverse.com/company-histories/Elan-Corporation-PLC-Company-History.html (ac-
cessed Dec. 23, 2014).
91 BioPharmaLink, Athena Diagnostics (Athena Neurosciences Inc.) (2002) http://www.biopharmalink.com/
companies/1677.htm (accessed Dec. 15, 2014).
92 Dalton, supra note 73.
93 Id.
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Tg2576 mice, which expressed amyloid in the brain.94 Mayo licensed Hsiao’s mouse
as well as AIA’s ‘258 patent for a transgenic mouse expressing an APP 670/671 (APP-
swe) mutation in order to be able to distribute the mouse models through Taconic, a
commercial mouse breeder and distributor.95
As Mayo licensing executives explained:
Mayo has covered the cost of breeding and genotyping Tg2576 mice that are free of spe-
cific pathogens. . . [M]anymicehavebeendistributed to academic researchers. Recipients
were asked only to pay a nominal fee, primarily to defray the shipping charge. Despite the
lawsuit, we will continue to support Hsiao Ashe in distributing Tg2576mice to academic
researchers.96
To further improve accessibility for researchers, Mayo also changed its licensing prac-
tices to remove a reach-through provision. That provision had retained rights for
Mayo to purchase rights to any intellectual property generated using the Tg2576 mice
through a negotiated agreement with mutually acceptable terms.97 Elan, on the other
hand, closely held itsmice for its ownpharmaceutical development efforts, which never
resulted in an FDA-approved treatment for Alzheimer’s disease.98
Mayo’s motion for summary judgment on the invalidity of the patents was granted
by JudgeAlsupof theNorthernDistrict ofCalifornia.99The issuewaswhether theAIA’s
‘258 transgenicmouse anticipated the Elan transgenicmouse patents, rendering Elan’s
patents invalid for lacking the required novelty.100 The prior art must expressly or in-
herently describe all of the elements and limitations of the invention as claimed in the
patent being evaluated. However, the prior art need not have been put in practice—
Mullan himself never made transgenic mice—but merely must be disclosed fully and
clearly enough that someone of ordinary skill in the art could havemade the invention.
Judge Alsup initially concluded that the ‘258 patent anticipated Elan’s patents be-
cause it described a variety of methods to make a transgenic mouse, and Elan had, in
fact, used one of these. In terms of the distinguishing feature of Elan’s patents that the
mice had to produce detectable quantities of ATF-betaAPP; he concluded that such
mice were simply a subset of the transgenic mice claimed in the ‘258 patent and were
covered by its claims. He therefore invalidated the patents Elan had asserted against
Mayo. Coverage of the decision exclaimed ‘Neuroscientists worldwide can continue
to enjoy access to an important transgenic mouse used for research into Alzheimer’s
disease’.101
94 Karen Hsiao et al., Correlative Memory Deficits, Abeta Elevation, and Amyloid Plaques in Transgenic Mice, 274
SCIENCE 99 (1996).
95 Taconic, Taconic Biosciences, 2014, http://www.taconic.com/?gclid=COygi5ySm8ECFZSPfgodwxAAOg
(accessed Dec. 18, 2014).
96 Steven G. Younkin & Susan Stoddard,Mayo and the Mouse, 404 NATURE 809, 809 (2000).
97 Id.
98 Dalton, supra note 72.
99 Elan Pharm., Inc. v. Mayo Foundation for Med. Educ. and Research, 175 F. Supp. 2d 1209 (N.D.Cal.2000)
100 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012). To be relevant for novelty purposes, the disqualifying prior art must disclose the
invention in a manner that enables a person of ordinary skill in the art, without undue experimentation, to
make or put it into practice.
101 Rex Dalton, Patent Suit on Alzheimer’s Mouse Rejected, 405 NATURE 989, 989 (2000).
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However, this optimism was short-lived, as Elan appealed the decision to the US
CAFC.102TheCAFCdisagreedwith JudgeAlsup, acceptingElan’s argument that ‘Mul-
lan does no more than teach broad known “recipes” for gene transfer, and that the
Mullan disclosure is simply an invitation to experiment, with no assurance of suc-
cess’.103 The CAFC also observed that ‘[a]lthough Mullan described known proce-
dures for making a transgenic animal, he neither described every element of the claims,
nor taught, in terms other than by trial and error and hope, production of a transgenic
mouse having detectable ATF-betaAPP in brain homogenate’.104 TheCAFC therefore
concluded that ‘a novel patented product is not “anticipated” if it did not previously
exist’—and that the invention claimedbyElan’s patents did not previously exist, at least
as far asMullan’s ‘258 patentwas concerned.105 SinceMullan did notmake a transgenic
mouse, and he did not state which of the methods for making transgenics might work
in practice, his patent did not anticipate Elan’s.
The 2002 CAFC decision was, however, not the end of the litigation. In 2003, the
CAFC issued an en banc decision that vacated (replaced) the earlier CAFC decision
on anticipation.106 The 2003 judgment concluded that Elan’s arguments were more
appropriately characterized as encompassing enablement. ‘Enablement requires that
“the prior art reference must teach one of ordinary skill in the art to make or carry out
the claimed invention without undue experimentation”.’107 Whether experimentation
is undue requires consideration, from the point of view of persons experienced in the
field of invention at the time of the filing date of the patent.108 The experimentation,
therefore, must bemore than purely routine,109 but it is not necessary for the disclosed
invention to have actually been made.
The CAFC (2003), therefore, re-characterized the issue as:
whether [Mullan’s] teachings enabled a person of ordinary skill, without undue exper-
imentation, to produce the desired transgenic mouse. This is doubtful considering the
reliance in the ‘258 patent on conditional statements, for example, “how vectors can be
constructed”, the transgene “canbe injected”, andother similar statements. . . Mullandoes
102 Elan Pharm., Inc. v. Mayo Foundation, Med. Educ. and Research., 304 F.3d 1221 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
103 Id. at 1228.
104 Id.
105 Id. at 1229.
106 Elan Pharmaceuticals, Inc. and Athena Neurosciences, Inc. v. Mayo Foundation for Medical Education
and Research, 346 F.3d. 1051 (2003). Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure determines
when an en banc (one before a majority of the circuit judges who are in regular active service and are
not disqualified) hearing or rehearing is warranted. It is only ordered is ‘(1) en banc consideration is
necessary to secure or maintain uniformity of the court’s decisions; or (2) the proceeding involved a
question of exceptional importance’. Cornell University Law School. Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure,
http://www.law.cornell.edu/rules/frap/rule˙35 (accessed Dec. 16, 2014).
107 Id., citing Minnesota Min. and Mfg. Co. v. Chemque, Inc, 303 F.3d 1294 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Enzo Biochem.
Inc. v Calgene Inc., 188 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
108 Specifically, of: ‘(1) the quantity of experimentation necessary, (2) the amount of direction or guidance pre-
sented, (3) the presence or absence of working examples, (4) the nature of the invention, (5) the state of the
prior art, (6) the relative skill of those in the art, (7) the predictability or unpredictability of the art, and (8)
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not suggest which, if any, of the methods and vectors he cites might reasonably be predi-
cated to succeed in producing a mouse operatively harboring the Swedish mutation.110
Since Judge Alsup had not considered enablement arguments in his initial judgment,
the CAFC remanded the case back to the District Court for reconsideration, with in-
structions to assess whether the enablement criterion was met. However, the District
Court never had the opportunity to rule on enablement. OnNovember 12, 2004, Elan
and Mayo settled the legal dispute that allowed both to use a range of research tools,
including the Tg2576 mouse.111
If reconsideration based on enablement had, in fact, occurred, it would likely
have been to the detriment of Mayo. The CAFC opinion in 2003 recognized strong
arguments that the ‘258 patent did not enable Elan’s patents (see discussion below), in
which case Elan’s patents would have been valid and enforceable.This same argument,
however, casts doubt on the validity of the ‘258 patent, since patents require sufficient
disclosure specifications to enable a person of ordinary skill in the art to make the in-
vention claimed.While it was never fully litigated, the CAFC’s analysis clearly suggests
the ‘258 patent was potentially invalid due to incomplete enablement.112
There are two further points that arise from this litigation. First, the CAFC (2002)
posed a pertinent policy question. In response to the dissent, Judge Newman stated
that:
although our colleague postulates “serious and unfortunate consequences in the future”
if the Elanmouse is deemed patentable, others may believe that without the possibility of
a patent on a new transgenicmouse, the hypothetical mouse envisioned byMullanmight
well remain no more than a hypothesis.
It is clear from the record, however, that Judge Newman’s concern was, while under-
standable, demonstrablymisplaced. Patent incentives were not the driving force for re-
searchers to create most of the transgenic mouse models for Alzheimer’s research. In-
deed,Hsiao’smice were created, and they were freely distributed to the community for
further research. The Tg2576 mouse had become one of the most widely used trans-
genic models for Alzheimer’s, despite uncertainties about user rights.113 Many groups
around the world were attempting to generate mouse models. At present, the Interna-
tional Mouse Strain Resource114 indicates 235 strains of APP mouse models available
110 Id.
111 Tom Fagan, Hushing the Mouse that Roared—Elan Mayo Patent Dispute Settled, ALZFORUM 2004, http://
www.alzforum.org/news/community-news/hushing-mouse-roared-elan-mayo-patent-dispute-settled
(accessed Dec. 23, 2014).
112 To be sure, an earlier patent such as Mullan’s ‘258 patent may be sufficiently (and patentably) enabling with
respect to what it claims—while not enabling so much as to inherently anticipate (and invalidate) a later
patent such as Elan’s. In this case, however, Mullan was also asserting rights over the transgenic mice that
Elan was claiming. For that reason, enablement ofMullan’s ‘258 patent as anticipatory prior art toward Elan’s
patent does, indeed, also reflect enablement ofMullan’s ‘258 patent as a condition of patentability. IfMullan’s
‘258 patent was enabled, Elan’s patent rights cannot survive, and if Elan’s patent rights over transgenic mice
are legitimate, thenMullan’s ‘258 patentwas likely not patentably enabled to the extent of covering transgenic
mice.
113 Fagan, supra note 109.
114 International Mouse Strain Resource (IMSR), http://www.findmice.org (accessed Nov. 19, 2014).
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globally as livemice, sperm, or embryos. In the 1990s, lack of transgenicmousemodels
was due to technical complexities, not lack of commercial or patent incentives.
Second,whenElan asserted its patents against theMayoFoundation in 1999,Heen-
joyed record profits ofmore than $1 billionUSD annually. It is clear, therefore, that the
aim of the litigation was primarily to safeguard the value of Elan’s in-house Alzheimer’s
research by limiting the supply of research models to rival companies.115 While this
business decision was based on patent rights, and might be contrary to the norms of
sharing within the research community, it fits squarely within the patent system’s eco-
nomic justifications of exclusivity and competitive advantage for a company that was
practicing the patent. Mayo was, via Taconic, distributing its licensed mouse lines to
industry for up to $850,000 per breeding pair and was therefore a target for suit, with
resulting implications for academic researchers in access to research tools ifMayowere
forced to cease distribution.116
From a societal/public policy perspective, the Elan case also presents the cautionary
tale of ‘putting all eggs in one basket’ through themonopolization of key research tools
for pre-clinical research. In 1999, Elan researcher Dale Schenk and his team raised the
possibility, using Elan’s transgenic mouse model, that immunization with amyloid-β
might be effective in preventing and treating Alzheimer’s disease.117 Elan commenced
phase I clinical trials in 104 participants from the US and UK, testing the safety of var-
ious doses of synthetic A-beta 42. Preliminary results were encouraging and news cov-
erage hailed the approach as revolutionary with the potential to change the therapeutic
landscape for Alzheimer’s disease.118 Investment analysts were bullish: after the com-
pletion of the successful phase I trial, shares of Elan were trading at over $60 USD.119
With a new partner, Wyeth-Ayerst, Elan began enrolling 352 participants with mild to
moderate Alzheimer’s disease in a phase IIa multicenter clinical trial in Europe and the
USThen, on January 17, 2002, the trialwas suspendedbecause four Frenchparticipants
developed encephalitis. ByMarch 1, a total of 15 participants had developed encephali-
tis and the trial was permanently halted with concomitant reductions in value of Elan
stocks.120 Thus, Elan’s approach had failed like most therapeutics in phase II.121
The Elan case, therefore, represents a clear case where a broad and diverse research
base can be preferable, as a matter of public health policy, for addressing a disease
as devastating and complex as Alzheimer’s disease. It is important to pursue a wide
range of therapeutic approaches. Such researchmust be supported by easy access to re-
search tools, such as transgenic mice.This example shows that aggressive enforcement
of patents over research tools stifled researchby increasing its costswhile therewas little
115 Bruce Boman, Of Mice and Men: a Curious Tale of Disappearing Plaques and Tumbling Stocks,
10 A. PSYCHIATRY, 287, 287–89 (2002), at 288, http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1046/
j.1440-1665.2002.00465.x/abstract (accessed Dec. 23, 2014).
116 Dalton, supra note 72.
117 Dale Schenk et al., Immunization with Amyloid-[beta] Attenuates Alzheimer-Disease-like Pathology in the
PDAPPMouse, 400 NATURE 173, 173–77 (1999).
118 Boman, supra note 113, at 288.
119 Id.
120 Id.
121 A recent article inNature Biotechnology indicates that only 15.3 per cent of investigational drugs gain regula-
tory approval in their lead indication and only 10.4 per cent in all indications.The attrition from phase 1–2 in
lead indications is 33 per cent, from phase 2–3 is 61 per cent. Michael Hay et al. Clinical Development Success
Rates for Investigational Drugs. 32 NAT. BIOTECHNOL 40 (2014).
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evidence that patents created the key incentives to develop such tools.122 To the extent
that patent incentives were important to Elan, the patents were used to restrict com-
peting research by blocking access to transgenic mouse models of Alzheimer’s disease
despite the questionable scope of Elan’s patents over thosemousemodels. JudgeNew-
man’s concern for losing patent incentives to create new transgenics was backwards in
this particular case. The prospect of patents was not a crucial incentive for transgenic
model development, but instead patents were actually used to block access to trans-
genic mice that had already been developed.
The JAXLitigation: Alzheimer’s Institute of America, Inc. v. ElanCorp. et al.
In this litigation, AIA asserted four patents against nine defendants (Table 2). Several
patents held by AIA ‘describe the use of assays, cell lines, and animal models includ-
ing the APP Swedish mutation’.123 Some of the defendants sold APPswe-containing
peptide sequences and other reagents. However, many of the defendants settled, and
litigation against the remaining, Elan and Eli Lilly, was subject to the disposition inAIA
v. Avid RadioPharmaceuticals et al., discussed below.
We now turn to the litigation against the Jackson Laboratory (JAX). AIA asserted
only its ‘258 transgenic mouse patent against JAX, alleging that 22 of themouse strains
in the JAX repository infringed its ‘258 patent.124 In 2011, AIA attempted to amend
its claim also to enforce the ’160 Patent which it ‘inadvertently failed to assert’.125 US
Magistrate Judge Laporte denied the amendment motion largely because the delay
of adding it would derail the scheduled steps in the litigation, in particular, a Mark-
man hearing on claims interpretation.Thedelaywould unacceptably increase litigation
costs.
Magistrate JudgeLaporte described JAXas ‘a non-profit academic institute that uses
and sells transgenicmice as a research tool, including for use inAlzheimer’s research’.126
JAX supported community academic and publication standards as well as being Na-
tional Institutes ofHealth (NIH) contractor tomakemice used in research available to
researchers.127 Funding a public repository such as JAX lessened the burden on indi-
vidual laboratories and enabled wide use of transgenic Alzheimer’s mouse models.128
Judge Laporte agreed with JAX’s opposition statement that:
the majority of the mice available from Jackson’s Alzheimer’s repository sell in low vol-
umes, and Jackson loses money on sales of mice from low volume strains. Jackson is
122 As previously discussed, ifMullan’s ‘258 patentwere enabled and valid, thenElan’s patents on transgenicmice
could not be, meaning that at least Elan’s patents provided no incentive for invention of transgenic mice as a
research tool, International Mouse Strain Resource (IMSR), supra note 112.
123 Landhuis & Strobel, supra note 83.
124 Lex Machina Results. Alzheimer’s Inst. of America, Inc. v. Elan Corp. P.L.C., Order Den. Leave to Amend,
Mar. 16, 2011, No. 10–00482. https://law.lexmachina.com/cases/200000190.
125 Id.
126 Id.
127 Francis S. Collins. NIH Director’s Statement on Lawsuit Related to Mouse Models of Alzheimer’s Disease,NIH,
Aug. 11, 2011, http://www.nih.gov/about/director/08122011˙statement˙alzheimers.htm (accessed Dec.
23, 2014).
128 Tania Bubela et al.,Managing Intellectual Property to Promote Pre-Competitive Research:TheMouse as a Model
for Constructing a Robust Research Commons, 20 J. L. INFO. & SCI. 98, 98–121 (2012); Paul N. Schofield et al.,
Post-Publication Sharing of Data and Tools, 461 NATURE 171, 171–73 (2009).
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therefore only able to distribute the accused Alzheimer’s mice through the generosity of
private philanthropy and federal government (NIH) grants.129
Further, JAX ‘provides the accused mice only to non-profit researchers, and loses
money doing so’.130 In addition, ‘patent litigation relating to itsmice is chilling progress
towards an Alzheimer’s cure’.131
Concern about the chilling effect of patent litigation on research was a theme inme-
dia coverage of the case.132 Quoted from an interview, David Einhorn, JAX in-house
counsel, reiterated a continued commitment to distributing the mice but worried that
‘moving forward, people may be less willing to donate mice to our repository, or even
use [Alzheimer’s disease]mice because of the fear of being drawn into litigation’.133 He
explained that institutions had been reluctant to deposit mice into the JAXAlzheimer’s
disease repository because, even though scientists might be willing, their institutions:
have felt hamstrung, or at least confused, by the complex patent landscape surrounding
research tools involving [the Swedish mutation], APPswe. As such, patents or pending
patent litigationhave impeded [Alzheimer’s disease] research formuchof the past decade
bymaking it hard to obtain key [Alzheimer’s disease]mousemodels or make new ones.134
In at least one instance, Einhorn was aware of an institution that AIA had threatened
withlitigation demanding a substantial license fee. Despite the threats, the institution
sent the mice to JAX, although some years later.135
Sexton responded to a 2010 article by Landhuis and Strobel and an equally crit-
ical 2011 article by Erika Check Hayden in Nature. He contended that AIA did not
threaten academic researchers with litigation and indeed supported such research.136
He claimed that ‘Jackson is selling the mice and making quite a lot of money in the
process. Furthermore, the mice Jackson is selling are, in many instances, being used
for commercial purposes—not academic purposes’.137 As an example, he cited the fact
that JAXprovided themice toUniversity of Pennsylvania (Penn) researchers,who then
used the mice to develop commercial imaging agents. Penn then spun out a company,
Avid RadioPharmaceuticals (Avid), whichwas then acquired by Eli Lilly for up to $800
million USD.138 US patent law’s explicit statutory framework for commercializing uni-
versity research makes Sexton’s argument particularly relevant. His placement of the
line between academic and commercial research139 moved commercial research into
129 Order Den. Leave to Amend, No. 10–00482, Mar. 16, 2011.
130 Id.
131 Id.
132 Landhuis & Strobel, supra note 83.
133 Id.
134 Id. [Emphasis added]
135 Landhuis & Strobel, supra note 83.
136 Id.; Erika Check Hayden, Patent Dispute Threatens US Alzheimer’s Research, 472 NATURE 20 (2011). Sexton
response in Nature comments.
137 Id.
138 Id.
139 The most recent milestone in patent law’s experimental use doctrine was effectively its abolition in Madey v.
Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351 (2002), but the literature long before recognized the problem of distinguishing
academic versus commercial (or basic versus applied) research for purposes of patent infringement analysis.
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academic institutions, and indeed highlights important questions about the proper role
of commercial motivations in academic research that is also publicly funded.140
However, JAX’s greatest concern during the litigationwas theAIAdemand that JAX
reveal thenamesof researchers towhomit haddistributedmice.141 JAXrefused to settle
because that would mean handing over the names of researchers who would then face
potential lawsuits.142 Geneticist Mike Sasner of JAX stated in an interview, ‘We knew
[AIA] was prepared to sue those researchers if any developments came as a result of
their using themice [as they had done to theUniversity of Pennsylvania]. At that point,
we realizedwe needed somebody to intervene, and that the government had an interest
in doing this’.143
JAXwas leftwith the impression, from these demands for scientists’ names, that AIA
intended to assert its patents against the institutions of Alzheimer’s disease researchers
who had either developed novelAPPswe lines, or who had used lines distributed by JAX
for research. For this reason, in a letter dated December 15, 2010, JAX requested sup-
port from the National Center for Research Resources (NCRR).144 JAX cited funding
support from NCRR and the fact that the AIA patent over the transgenic mice, as the
result of a continuation application in the US Patent and TrademarkOffice (USPTO),
was granted only in 2009, 17 years after the first patent over nucleotide sequences was
filed in 1992. AIA sought not only damages, but also the discontinuation of JAX’s dis-
tribution of the 22 mouse models for Alzheimer’s research. If this had succeeded, the
foremost center for distributing Alzheimer’s disease animal models for research would
have been hamstrung. Citing other AIA litigation, JAX also emphasized the fear of lit-
igation that had spread throughout the academic community, hampering the deposit,
and distribution of mouse lines.
In practical terms, JAX requested that NCCR confirm that ‘the federal govern-
ment supports and stands behind Jackson’s distributionofAlzheimermouse strains’.145
JAX asked NIH and its Office of General Counsel to request that the Department of
Justice intervene in the litigation as an interested party, given the investment of fed-
eral funds in Alzheimer’s research. But more importantly, JAX requested a letter of
See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights and Experimental Use, 56 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1017, 1018 (1989) (arguing that economic trends in biotechnology research had blurred the
distinction between basic and applied research); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Proprietary Rights and the Norms of
Science in Biotechnology Research, 97 YALE L.J. 177, 195–97 (1987) (same). Indeed, despite the demise of
experimental use inMadey, debate over the distinction remains a live issue. See Katherine J. Strandburg,User
Innovator Community Norms: At the Boundary Between Academic and Industry Research, 77 FORDHAM L. REV.
2237 (2009).
140 For two particularly influential discussions in the legal literature of the role that patents should play in trans-
lating upstream academic research into downstream market goods, compare Arti K. Rai, Regulating Scientific
Research: Intellectual Property Rights and the Norms of Science, 94 NW.U. L. REV. 77 (1999),with F. ScottKieff,
Property Rights and Property Rules for Commercializing Inventions, 85 MINN. L. REV. 697 (2001).
141 Casey McDonald, Alzheimer’s Mouse Model Lawsuit Dismissed, BIOTECHNIQUES (2011), http://
www.biotechniques.com/news/Alzheimers-Mouse-Model-Lawsuit-Dismissed/biotechniques-320967.html
(accessed Dec. 23, 2014).
142 Check Hayden, supra note 134; Landhuis & Strobel, supra note 83.
143 Landhuis & Strobel, supra note 83.
144 Copy of letter on file with the authors.
145 Id.
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Authorization andConsent.146The effect ofAuthorization andConsent is to relieve a gov-
ernment contractor—in this case, JAX—from patent infringement liability, effectively
shielding JAX from infringement lawsuits and substituting the federal government as
defendant in the event that a patentee still wished to pursue claims of infringement.147
As in this case,Authorization and Consentmay be granted post hocduring infringement
litigation.148
On June 17, 2011, NIH Director Francis Collins agreed to provide JAX with
Authorization and Consent to use and manufacture any US patented invention to
access, develop, and distribute transgenic mouse models of Alzheimer’s disease under
specific grants to JAX fromNCCR, the National Institute on Aging, and NIH.The let-
ter covered the 22 mouse strains that were the subject of the litigation and that had
been brought to JAX under the support of a grant from NCRR. On August 10, 2011,
litigation against JAXwas dismissed without prejudice, with each party bearing its own
attorney fees and costs.149 In the agreement between the parties, dated August 9, 2011,
AIAagreed to a covenant not to sue JAX for anypast or future infringement. JAXdenied
all AIA infringement allegations.NIHDirectorCollins affirmed that ‘provision of these
important research tools to scientific investigators. . . is critical to the advancement of
our understanding of Alzheimer’s disease and to the development of new diagnostics
and treatments for this devastating disease’.150
The dismissal of the suit against JAX was widely hailed as positive. Einhorn stated:
[W]e hope and trust that the dismissal will encourage researchers and institutions who
have been inhibited by the fear of being sued to use mouse models in their Alzheimer’s
research. . . As well, we trust that the intervention of the NIH on behalf of Jackson will
encourage researchers who develop new mouse models, both of Alzheimer’s and other
major diseases, to provide them to the Jackson mouse repository so they can be shared
with the rest of the research community.151
David Holtzman of Washington University School of Medicine in St Louis, Missouri,
concurred:Themicedistributedby the JAXhavemade amajor contribution in allowing
investigators all over the world to make fundamental basic and disease-related insights
146 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1498 (2006) and ‘Authorization and Consent’ under the Federal Acquisition Regula-
tions Clause 52.227.1. ‘Authorization and Consent’ is an affirmative defense that was originally intended to
aid government procurement efforts duringWorldWar I (Richmond ScrewAnchorCo. v. United States, 275
U.S. 331, 345, 48 S.Ct. 194, 72 L.Ed. 303 (1928); Madey v. Duke University, 413 F. Supp.2d 601 (District
Court, M.D. North Carolina, 2006). For ‘Authorization and Consent’, two conditions must be met: the ac-
tivity must be conducted for the government, meaning it is ‘in furtherance and fulfillment of a statement of
government policy’ which serves the Government’s interest and is for the Government’s benefit; and second,
the authorization or consent of the Government, which may be express or implied (Madey, 413 F.Supp. 2d
601 (2006)).
147 28 U.S.C. § 1498 (2006) limits the remedies available to patent holder. Patent holders are entitled to fair
compensation for the use of the patented invention but no other remedy, such as damages or injunctive relief.
148 See Hughes Aircraft Company v. United States, 29 Fed.Cl. 197 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
149 2011WL 3875341, Order Grant. Mot. to Dismiss, No. 10–00482, Mar. 16, 2011.
150 Letter, supra note 142.
151 Check Hayden, supra note 134.
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into Alzheimer’s disease.This type of effort should only get to be a bigger, not smaller,
enterprise until we have solved this disease.152
Alzheimer’s Institute of America, Inc. v. Avid RadioPharmaceuticals et al.
AIA asserted two patents against the Penn and its spin-off company Avid, the ‘169 nu-
cleic acid and the ‘258 transgenic mouse patents (Table 2).153 AIA alleged that re-
searchers at Penn used Tg2576 mice to test imaging agents. Penn then patented the
imaging technology and licensed it toAvid.Themicewere sourced from JAX.ThePenn
patents were evidence of the use of AIA’s patented technologies. AIA sued Avid on the
basis of a publication by Avid’s founder and CEO, Dr Skovronsky, that used a mouse
model to detect amyloid plaques.154 In 2010, Avid was acquired by Eli Lilly and Com-
pany (Lilly) for $800 million USD.155 Moreover, in a closing of the loop, Lilly had en-
tered into agreements with AthenaNeurosciences, which had an exclusive license with
Imperial College to both research and patents from Hardy’s team on the APP gene.
The defendants therefore argued that Imperial College had an ownership interest in
the Swedish mutation, an interest which, if proven, would have given Avid/Lilly the
rights to use the invention.156 Other defenses to invalidate the patents included antici-
pation, obviousness, and failure to satisfy the written description, enablement, and/or
best mode requirements.157 The argument that prevailed at trial, however, was failure
to name the true and correct inventors with deceptive intent.
A threshold issue in all litigation is whether the plaintiff, in this case AIA, has stand-
ing to bring the action. For patent infringement actions, if the plaintiff does not own the
patent, it has no standing. Among the foundational arguments before Judge Savage in
this litigation, therefore,wasonmotions for summary judgmentonwhetherAIAowned
the patents. Since summary judgment cannot be granted if there are disputed material
facts158 and Judge Savage found that factual disputes did remain, his 2011 Memoran-
dum Opinion denied summary judgment, and the issues on standing were heard by a
jury at trial.159 The jury found against AIA, but there are no written reasons, just the
jury’s verdict.160 AIA then filed a post-trial motion seeking to set aside the jury’s verdict
152 Esther Landhuis, Case Dismissed—NIH Rescues JAX From APPswe Patent Suit, ALZFORUM 2011, http://
www.alzforum.org/news/community-news/case-dismissed-nih-rescues-jax-appswe-patent-suit (accessed
Dec. 23, 2014).
153 Alzheimer’s Inst. of America, 2011 WL 3875341; Alzheimer’s Inst. Of America, 2013 WL 3305738, supra
note 6.
154 Daniel M. Skovronsky et al., In Vivo Detection of Amyloid Plaques in a Mouse Model of Alzheimer’s Disease, 97
PNAS 7609, 7609–7614 (2000).
155 Landhuis, supra note 153.
156 2011 WL 3875341, Defendant Avid’s Answer, Affirmative Defense, and Countercl. to Plaintiff’s Complaint,
Jan. 25, 2011.
157 Id.
158 Summary judgment is an exception to the general rule ofUSpatent litigation (indeed,mostUS civil litigation)
that plaintiffs are entitled to a jury trial. However, juries are typically tasked with evaluating disputes of fact
while judges evaluate disputes of law.Therefore, a jury trial may be unnecessary if the dispute is entirely over
legal conclusions with no genuine dispute over the relevant facts. In such cases, the judgemay decide the case
summarily as to the legal dispute, with no need for the case to proceed to the jury. For the legal standard for
summary judgment and judicial explication of the standard, see Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56; Celotex
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1986).
159 Alzheimer’s Inst. of America, 2011WL 3875341, supra note 6.
160 Alzheimer’s Inst. Of America, 2013WL 3305738, supra note 6.
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and for Judge Savage to grant either judgment in AIA’s favor as a matter of law or else
a new trial.The 2013MemorandumOpinion by Judge Savage addressed this post-trial
motion and added clarity to the jury verdict.161 Here, we summarize both the 2011 and
2013MemorandumOpinions.
The twoarguments against standingbrought by thedefendantswere that (1)Mullan
was not the sole inventor on the patents and therefore the patents were invalid and (2)
even if Mullan were the sole inventor, the ownership of the patents vested in USF by
virtue of Mullan’s employment at USF and the operation of Florida law. We address
inventorship and ownership in turn.
Inventorship
The inventorship issue hinged on whether others should have been named as co-
inventors on the AIA patent.162 Inventors are individuals who contribute to the
conception of the patentable invention,163 and joint inventorship is governed by the
Patent statute.164 Each inventor must be named in a patent application.
The initial statements of defense stated that members of the Swedish team should
have been named as co-inventors.165 In AIA’s suit againstMayo andMyriad (Table 2),
Lannfelt, at least had been deposed on the issue of inventorship.166 Lannfelt andWin-
blad had allegedly claimed co-inventorship at the time the patents were still pending
but had failed to disclose the dispute to theUSPTO.167 In an interviewwith AlzForum,
Lannfelt stated that following his visit to Hardy at Imperial College, the sequencing of
the Swedish samples was split betweenMullan (exon 16) and Lannfelt (exon 17).The
mutation was located on exon 16, and the ensuing publication had Mullan as first au-
thor and Lannfelt as last. As he recalled: ‘It was a good collaboration and I have never
regretted it. Then [Mullan] told me he was going to take out a patent and said you can
only have one name on it.Thiswas untrue. But in 1992, I knewnothing about patenting
mutations’.168 In terms of the discovery of theAPP gene, Lannfelt stated, ‘I would have
found the mutation without Mullan, though later. He would never have found it with-
out us’. Mullan, on the other hand, claimed that Lannfelt andWinblad did not deserve
161 Id.
162 In terms of patent law, individuals who file and prosecute patent applications have ‘a duty of candor and good
faith in dealing with the [USPTO], which includes a duty to disclose ...all information known to that indi-
vidual to be material to patentability’ (Manual of Patent Examining Procedure [hereinafer MPEP] § 1.56–
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/documents/appxr˙1˙56.htm#cfr37s1.56 (accessedDec. 15,
2014)). The USPTO will not grant patents where there was fraud or if the duty to disclose was ‘violated
through bad faith or intentional misconduct’. (MPEP § 1.56).
163 ‘Conception is the ‘formation in themindof the inventor, of a definite andpermanent ideaof the complete and
operative invention, as it is hereafter to be applied in practice.’ (Hybertech, Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies,
Inc., 802 F.2d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 1986) quoting Robinson on Patents 532 (1890)).
164 See 35 U.S.C. § 116 (2006). Each joint inventor need not have contributed to every feature of the subject
matter claimed in the patent, and contributions need not be equal (Sewall v. Walters, 21 F.3d 411, 415 (Fed.
Cir. 1994); 35 U.S.C § 116 (2006)). Each need only perform part of the task that produces the invention.
A contribution to one claim is enough (SmithKline Diagnostics, Inc. v. Helena Lab.Corp. 859 F.2d 878, 888
(Fed. Cir. 1988).
165 2011WL 3875341, Defendant Avid’s Answer, Jan. 25, 2011.
166 Dalton, supra note 102; Landhuis & Strobel, supra note 83.
167 Landhuis & Strobel, supra note 83.
168 Landhuis & Strobel, supra note 83.
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recognition on the patents because ‘they only providedDNA, andmade no intellectual
contribution’.169
At trial, the issue of inventorship focused onwhether team lead, Hardy, should have
been named as co-inventor. As an inventor, Mullan made a legal ‘oath and declara-
tion’ that he believed himself to be the original and first inventor. Since the issuance
of the patent created a presumption thatMullan was the sole inventor, the onus was on
the defendants to prove otherwise by ‘clear and convincing evidence’, a standard only
slightly more relaxed than the stringent ‘proof beyond a reasonable doubt’ necessary in
criminal law. Given the degree of collaboration between Hardy andMullan, it was rea-
sonable for the jury to conclude that the invention was ‘the product of a collaboration
between two or more persons working together to solve the problem addressed’.170
That collaboration need not have been coincidental in time or in location. The joint
inventor need only have made ‘a significant contribution on the road to and not neces-
sarily at reaching conception’.171 The evidence ofHardy’s contributions was supported
not only by Hardy, but also by contemporaneous documents, such as laboratory note-
books and correspondence, and witnesses who had been part of the Imperial College
research team. Both Hardy and another teammember testified that Hardy andMullan
held off sequencinguntil they arrived inFlorida and this ‘couldhavebeen consideredby
the jury as both attempting to deceive Imperial College andUSF.. . . the jury could have
concluded that omitting Hardy as a co-inventor on the patent application was part of
the ploy to defraud Imperial College and Athena’.172 The evidence showed that Hardy
was involved in, and directing, the process to discover themutation, leading to the con-
clusion that he substantially contributed to the invention.
Ownership and waiver
The issue of initial ownership of the patents is central because, if Mullan never owned
the patents, then he had no ownership interests to assign to AIA, meaning that AIA
also could not own and enforce the patents. Mullan conceived of the inventions when
he was employed at USF, andHardy was employed by both Imperial College andUSF.
The issue of ownership, therefore, was answered in the first instance by Florida law,
which vests ownership of any inventions developed or discovered by an employee in
the course of employment with USF.173 Employees of USF are under a duty of dis-
closure to the University,174 but USF reserves the right to relinquish its ownership
interest. Because Mullan was an employee of USF and pursuing Alzheimer’s disease
research, which he was hired to do, ownership of the patents automatically and imme-
diately vested in USF by operation of Florida law. In such a case ‘the inventor has no
property rights to assign, and any purported assignee lacks standing to sue for patent
infringement’.175
169 Dalton, supra note 102.
170 Alzheimer’s Inst. Of America, 2013WL 3305738 (citing Fina Oil etc.), supra note 6, at 2.
171 Alzheimer’s Inst. Of America, 2013WL 3305738, supra note 6, at 3.
172 Id.
173 FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. R. 6C4–10.012(3)(c), implementing FLA. STAT. § 240.229 (superseded by §
1004.23).
174 FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. R. 6C4–10.012(3)(a)(1)).
175 Alzheimer’s Inst. of America, 2011WL 3875341, supra note, 6 at 8.
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The real issue, therefore, was whether Florida knowingly waived its rights to the in-
vention. Under the law, the inventor had the duty to disclose the invention at which
time USF could elect to transfer its rights to the employee. However, to be effective,
such an assignment or release of rights ‘must contain a provision that the invention re-
mains available royalty-free to the State of Florida for government purposes’.176 The
‘unequivocal’ evidence for waiver relied on by AIA was the letter signed by the Vice
President of Research on May 4, 1992, that stated, ‘[A]ll ownership of rights in any
work carried out by [Hardy and Mullan] and inventions made by them before August
15, 1992 belong exclusively toHardy andMullan’.177 However, therewas evidence that
would have led a reasonable jury to conclude that: ‘Newcome did not intend to waive
USF’s rights to the Swedish mutation invention’.178 Evidence showed USF adminis-
trators were aware of Hardy and Mullan’s intellectual property disputes with Imperial
College and wanted to draw a line between work done in the UK on the Londonmuta-
tion andwork done atUSF.USF administrators believed thatMullanwas in the process
of settingupHardy’s laboratory and, therefore, couldnot have startednewwork atUSF.
They were unaware of his off-campus sequencing of the Swedish mutation.The cut-off
date in the letter reflected time for Hardy to complete work at Imperial College and
the start of the new semester at USF.179 No further actions or correspondence showed
that Newkome was ever aware that the Swedish mutation had been discovered while
Mullan was employed by USF. In conclusion, ‘[t]he jury’s determination that USF did
not knowingly and intentionally waive its rights because Newkome lacked sufficient
knowledge to waive a known right was amply supported by the evidence’.180
Appeal to the CAFC
Following the jury trial and the 2013MemorandumOpinion denyingAIA’smotion for
a new trial, Sexton stated:
for almost 20 years, AIA has been and continues to be the record owner of title to the
Swedish mutation patents. . . Michael Mullan’s inventive contribution to the discovery of
the Swedish mutation and the resulting invention was not disputed in the litigation and
remains unchallenged. Per its policy, AIAwill not comment further on pending litigation,
other than to state that it remains ongoing in the trial court and will likely continue in the
US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.181
176 Id. citing FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. R. 6C4–10.012(3)(e)(2)-(3).
177 Alzheimer’s Inst. Of America, 2013WL 3305738, supra note 6, at 5.
178 Id.
179 Savage, J. stated, ‘there is ample evidence to support a finding that at the time he signed theMay 4, 1992 letter,
Newkome had no knowledge of the discovery of the Swedish mutation invention and consequently could
not have known that it had been discovered while Mullan was employed at USF. He believed that Mullan
and Hardy had not yet begun any new research at USF. Prior to that time, neither Mullan nor Hardy had
disclosed that they had done work or made any discoveries while at USF. Nor did Mullan, Hardy or Sexton
reveal anything about any such work at the meeting where he signed the letter. Mullan told Newkome at
the meeting that he had been unable to do any new work because the laboratories were not ready. . . The
message conveyed, whether intentionally or not, was that work at USF had not yet started’. Alzheimer’s Inst.
Of America, 2013WL 3305738, supra note 6.
180 Alzheimer’s Inst. Of America, 2013WL 3305738, supra note 6, at 10.
181 Landhuis, supra note 54.
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However, others commented that success was unlikely because both parts of the jury
verdict, inventorship andwaiver, would need to be reversed.182 That prediction proved
correct.Without giving reasons, the three-judgeCAFCpanel (JudgesNewman, Plager,
and Moore) affirmed the 2013 Memorandum Decision of Judge Savage on May 16,
2014.183
Disposition on other AIA litigation
Following the final disposition in AIA v. Avid (2014), all further ongoing litigation
(Table 2) was discontinued.184 The only outstanding legal actions involve disputes
over costs, all of which were awarded against AIA. However, some defendants, such as
the Mayo Foundation, agreed to licensing terms on some inventions and many of the
co-defendants in the Elan litigation had settled.185 As noted by Landhuis (2012): ‘One
question raised by the recent court finding is that defendants in previous suits brought
by AIA who have chosen to settle may now consider suing AIA on the argument that
AIA never had standing to bring infringement claims on a patent it did not own’.186
LEGAL ANALYSIS OF PATENT VALIDITY
TheAIA’s litigation failed, but it is worth briefly reviewing substantial legal barriers that
would have stood in the way of patent enforcement even if AIA had been deemed the
rightful owner of patent rights.The claims in theAPPswe patents were, as noted, highly
vulnerable on grounds of enablement for the transgenic mouse claims. But what about
the claims on the methods and the DNAmolecules claimed in the patents?
Both method and composition of matter (DNA molecule) claims would also have
been quite vulnerable to challenge, because the claimed invention was based on find-
ing APPswe mutations in DNA derived from human samples. Patent claims covering
those mutations would therefore contravene Justice Clarence Thomas’s unanimous
Supreme Court decision of June 13, 2013, which states: ‘a naturally occurring DNA
segment is a product of nature and not patent eligible merely because it has been iso-
lated, but that cDNA is patent eligible because it is not naturally occurring’.187 Claims
to APPswemutations themselves, or isolated DNA containing them, would thus be in-
valid, although DNA constructs engineered to create cell lines and transgenics would
be eligible to patent. Such claims to engineered DNA would have to be new, useful,
non-obvious, fully enabled and adequately described. Given the state of Mullan’s sci-
ence at the time of patent application, which largely amounted to having discovered the
182 Landhuis, supra note 54.
183 Alzheimers Inst. of America, Inc. v. Avid RadioPharmaceuticals,Nos. 2013–1544 (Fed. Cir. May 16, 2014).
184 Alzheimer’s Inst. of America,Nos. 2013–1544 (2014).The Order dismissing suit due against the Oklahoma
Medical Research Foundation andComentis due to AIA’s lack of standing was entered onDec. 17, 2012.The
case againstElan and remaining co-defendantswasdecidedwithprejudice in favorof thedefendants onAug.3,
2012 based on the jury decision that AIA lacked standing to bring the suit. The magistrate granted summary
judgment and deniedAIA’s request to stay the case through its ongoing appeals against Avid Pharmaceuticals
and the University of Pennsylvania. It is likely that litigation against the other defendants, including Myriad
Genetics, settled, but the outcomes are not clear.
185 Landhuis, supra note 54. AnaSpec, Inc., Fremont, California; Immuno-Biological Laboratories, Inc., Min-
neapolis, Minnesota; Phoenix Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Burlingame, California; and American Peptide Com-
pany, Inc., Sunnyvale, California.
186 Landhuis, supra note 54.
187 Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, supra note 5, at 1.
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APPswemutations, thesewouldbehighhurdles to clear.Asnoted,Mullannever created
cell lines or transgenic models. The method claims in the AIA patents might also have
been judged invalid, based on another unanimous decision of the US Supreme Court
inMayo v Prometheus.188 That 2012 case SupremeCourt decision invalidated claims on
diagnostic methods that claim a ‘law of nature’ with insufficient additional invention.
The likelihood that theMullan method andDNAmolecule claims would be judged in-
valid and which are further corroborated by the December 2014 decision of the CAFC
inUniversity of Utah v Ambry Genetics (also known as In Re: BRCA1 and BRCA2-based
Hereditary Cancer Test Patent Litigation).189
While the validity of the patent claims granted toMullan ismoot because the patents
were invalidated on grounds of standing and inventorship, the question of whether
patent rights on transgenic animal models were granted appropriately to Mullan nev-
ertheless bears scrutiny because of the centrality of the transgenic mouse claims in
all the litigation that followed from having discovered the APPswe mutations. Given
the CAFC’s analysis of enablement in the Elan litigation, it seems likely the USPTO
granted patent claims for transgenic mice with APPswemutations prematurely and to
thewrong inventor.190The ‘258patent claimed anAPPswe transgenicmouse (Table 1),
which expresses the human APP or a fragment thereof with the Swedish mutation.191
The specifications, under the heading ‘Production of Transgenic Animals withMutant
APP Allele’, describe methods for the generation of the nucleotide sequence construct
for insertion into themouse, followedby very short descriptions for preparing theDNA
for injection, microinjection, and one sentence on identifying a transgenic mouse.The
patent references only a generic laboratory technique manual that arose as a result of
courses at Cold Spring Harbor.192
Few researchers could make transgenic mice in 1992. Core facilities for mouse
model work were in their infancy. The first publication on a mouse containing foreign
DNA, generally inserted via pronuclear injection of mouse zygotes, was first published
in 1980193 with first expressionof a transgene in 1981.194TheOncoMouse,which in the
1980’s was genetically modified with a mouse (not a human) gene to exhibit a predis-
position toward cancer, was developed and patented by researchers atHarvardUniver-
sity.195 But making such transgenic mice was technically complex and required highly
skilled personnel. With the success of the OncoMouse, there was hope that models for
other diseases would rapidly follow. The skills to make transgenic mice spread slowly
fromkey research centers,with thefirst publicationof relevant protocols being theCold
Spring Harbor laboratory manual, which began as a ‘help’ manual for an annual course
188 Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Lab, supra note 5.
189 In Re: BRCA1 and BRCA2-based Hereditary Cancer Test Patent Litigation 2014–1361, 1366 (C.A.F.C.,
2014).
190 Elan Pharmaceuticals, Inc. and Athena Neurosciences, Inc. v. Mayo Foundation for Medical Education and
Research, supra note 104.
191 U.S. Patent No. 5455,169, (filed Jun. 4, 1992).
192 BRIGID HOGAN, ET AL., MANIPULATING THEMOUSE EMBRYO (1986).
193 Jon W. Gordon et al., Genetic Transformation of Mouse Embryos by Microinjection of Purified DNA, 77 PROC.
NATL. ACAD. SCI. USA 7380 (1980).
194 Ralph L. Brinster et al., Somatic Expression of Herpes Thymidine Kinase in Mice Following Injection of a Fusion
Gene into Eggs, 27 CELL 223 (1981).
195 Timothy A. Stewart et al., SpontaneousMammary Adenocarcinomas in Transgenic MiceThat Carry and Express
MTV/myc Fusion Genes, 38 CELL 627, 627–37 (1984).
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at the laboratory.196 Evidence for the novelty and complexity of the creation of trans-
genics in the early 1990s is the fact that researchers could announce new transgenic
mouse models in high impact journals, which is no longer the case.197
This certainly suggests that a patent that claimed transgenic mice in 1992 would
likely have been non-obvious over the state of the prior art. The inventive gap would
have been large between the prior art and the claimed transgenic mice, counseling in
favor of separate patentability of transgenic animals beyond mere discovery of a muta-
tion sequence. The broader the patent claim, the more detailed the patent disclosure
must be in order to adequately fill that inventive gapwith enabling instruction. In other
words, if an invention is clearly non-obvious because ordinary skill in the art is low,
then the inventor tends to face a greater disclosure burden tomore fully raise that level
of skill. Conversely, if a sparse disclosure is enough because ordinary skill in the art is
high enough to fill the gaps, then that higher level of skill also tends to undercut non-
obviousness. By design, the requirements of non-obviousness and enablement are in
some tension with each other so that the public may enjoy the full benefit of the patent
bargain by receiving broad instruction in exchange for granting broad patent rights.The
problem with the AIA patents was inadequate enablement, for the state of the art grew
slowly despite the patent disclosure.
It was not until February 1995 that researchers at Athena Neurosciences, Exemplar
Corporation, Lilly Research Laboratories, the Scripps Research Institute, the Univer-
sity of California at San Diego, and the Laboratory of Clinical Science of the National
Institute of Mental Health published in Nature the first transgenic mouse model that
overexpressed the V717F β-amyloid precursor protein.198 According to Penn pathol-
ogist John Trojanowski, this was the ‘first mouse “that really shook the world”’.199 In-
deed, Tanzi, describes it as a ‘sensational discovery’, and in an accompanying article,
Karen Duff and Hardy stated that ‘creating such a model [as the Athena mouse] has
been no easy task’.This paper goes on to pose questions about ‘the production of these
remarkable animals’.200 These relate to the technical difficulties and uncertainties in
producing the models:
what element of the construct was crucial to its success (the promoter, the use of introns
or the use ofmutations?)Willmice containing one ormore pathogenicmutations carried
on full genomic constructs. . . be even better?. . . The answers to many of these questions
[including about the pathophysiology of Alzheimer’s disease] will now come quickly,
196 Jennifer Hogan et al.,Building a Knowledge Base for Systems Pathology, 9 BR. BIOINFORM. 518 (2008);HOGAN,
supra note 194.
197 Christine Sturchler-Pierrat et al., Two Amyloid Precursor Protein Transgenic Mouse Models with Alzheimer
Disease-like Pathology, 94 PROC. NATL. ACAD. SCI. USA 13287, 13287–92 (1997). Currently available mouse
models and their relative utility are discussed in Jeannie Chin, Selecting a Mouse Model of Alzheimer’s Dis-
ease in 670 ALZHEIMER’S DISEASE AND FRONTOTEMPORAL DEMENTIA, METHODS IN MOLECULAR BIOLOGY
169–89 (Erik D. Roberson ed., 2011). The article lists 10 APP mouse models, with five accompanying pa-
pers published between 1995 and 1999 and 12 papers in the 2000s. Further publications on mouse models
for Alzheimer’s disease also emerged from 1997 onwards, including from more researchers at The Scripps
Institute and Novartis.
198 Dora Games,Alzheimer-type Neuropathology in Transgenic Mice Overexpressing V717F Beta-amyloid Precursor
Protein, 373 NATURE 523, 523–27 (1995).
199 TANZI & PARSON, supra note 19, at 144–145.
200 Karen Duff & John Hardy,Mouse Model Made, 373 NATURE 476, 476–77 (1995).
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especially if these mice are made available to the general research community. Clearly
expanding and distributing colonies of the mutants should be a priority.201
The latter quote fromHardy is ironic givenhis ownattempts topatent transgenicmouse
models of the Londonmutation and license these to Athena while still at Imperial Col-
lege.
According to Tanzi:
the Athenamousemodel originally had been engineered by scientists at the biotech com-
pany TSI, Inc. Apparently, TSI didn’t realize how earthshaking its mouse line was, for
Exemplar—a division of TSI—put the model up for sale. Athena, upon close scrutiny
of the mouse, saw that it was both greatly overexpressing A-beta and producing an
Alzheimer’s like pathology and immediately bought out Exemplar.
The model, in its development through the summer of 1996 had ‘fifty-some Athena
researchers perfecting it’.202 Yet, Athena, as discussed above, was reluctant to share the
model that was so central to its drug discovery efforts.
A mouse model of the Swedish mutation did not eventuate until October 1996,
more than four years after the APPswemutation was published. The transgenic mouse
incorporating APPswe was developed by Karen Hsiao at the University of Min-
nesota.203 This was the model distributed by Mayo under a licensing agreement with
AIA. However, most importantly, a transgenic mouse with a single mutation was still
not a useful model for Alzheimer’s disease and drug testing, because it did not demon-
strate all of the pathophysiology of the disease.204 The more valuable transgenic an-
imals, which became the industry standard, had multiple mutations to better model
brainplaques, including addingmutations in thepresenilin genes.205 Nevertheless,with
all the resources of academia and the biotechnology and pharmaceutical sectors com-
bined, it took four years fromMullan’s claims for other researchers to make anAPPswe
transgenic mouse.
In conclusion, it is clear that in 1992, the creation of a transgenic mouse, by a sole
inventor who was a clinician/geneticist with no background in transgenic or mouse re-
search, was highly speculative at best, and granting patents rights on transgenics based
on DNA sequence of the mutation was a mistaken evaluation of the state of the art by
theUSPTO.Three to four years of intensivework by large teams to produce anAPPswe
transgenicmouse is a solid working definition of ‘undue experimentation’, the criterion
for invalidity of a patent based on enablement. The USPTO lapse is particularly con-
cerning given the 17-year examination history of the AIA patents at the USPTO—the
transgenic mouse patent issued only in 2009 and to the wrong inventor. The continu-
ation problem compounds the fact that AIA did not seem to enable the full scope of
what was claimed in its broad claims over transgenic mice. It represents an example
of how inadequate enablement can impede downstream research, two decades after
the law changed to limit continuation abuse. The case thus also became an instance of
201 Id.
202 TANZI & PARSON, supra note 19, at 219–222.
203 Hsiao et al., supra note 92.
204 Chin, supra note 195.
205 TANZI & PARSON, supra note 19, at 219–222.
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‘submarining’, in which a prior patent is enforced a subsequent inventor who actually
reduces the invention to practice.The situation arose here because the priority datewas
in 1992. All applications filed as of June 8, 1995, and later can gain in strategic issuance
delay only what they give up in post-issuance patent term (because the expiration date
is 20 years from the priority date of application rather than 17 years from the patent’s
issuance date).206 In other words, theAPPswe transgenic animal patent was an instance
of a systemic problem that was recognized as such and addressed through legislation.
This case instantiates the threat of patent trolls emerging with invalid claims that
have been improvidently granted by the USPTO. Examiners spend only limited time
with each application and patent offices expend limited resources on initial reviews;
both cause problems in rapidly evolving fields.207 Commentators have noted the sub-
stantial error in examination at patent offices,208 and the issue has been raised as com-
pounding the impact of NPEs, such as AIA.209 A recent report on Patent Assertion and
US Innovation points to the need for clearer patents with a high standard of novelty and
non-obviousness.210 Faster and less expensive mechanism to challenge the validity of
patents, such as the new process for post-grant review implemented by the America In-
vents Act, are a promising step to enable rapid review of questionable and overly broad
claims that impact research.211
POLICY IMPLICATIONS-ABERRANT FACTS OR TIP OF THE ICEBERG?
This case has implications for policy. One key question is about the value of patents
in the research ecosystem; another is about the role of NPEs or patent assertion enti-
ties, such as AIA. In 2012, NPEs filed 62 per cent of IP infringement suits in the USA,
a tripling since 2010.212 Biotechnology in general, and biomedical research in partic-
ular, are vulnerable to increasing litigation from NPEs in that there is uncertainty in
both the scope of claims and potentially infringing activities.213 Assertions of patent in-
fringement are costly to counter; defendants bear the cost of investigation to furnish
evidence that their activities have not infringed the patents. In addition, patent litiga-
tion ranges from $1–6 million (USD), or even more, depending on the complexity of
the case. In light of costs and uncertainty, many defendants settle (as was the case for
most defendants here). Settlement amounts:
are affected more by the parties’ relative opportunity costs of going to trial and attitudes
towards risk factors that favor [NPEs], whose legal fees are low (since they do not have
to provide much evidence to assert there has been patent infringement), and who do not
206 35U.S.C. § 154 (amended byUruguay RoundAgreement Act, Pub. L. No. 103–465, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994)).
207 Robin Feldman, Intellectual Property Wrongs, 18 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 250, 264 (2013).
208 Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1495 (2001).
209 President’s Council of Economic Advisers, the National Economic Council, and the Office of Science &
Technology Policy. Patent Assertion and US Innovation (June 2013), http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/
default/files/docs/patent˙report.pdf (accessed Dec. 16, 2014).
210 Id.
211 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. 112–29, § 6, 125 Stat. 284 (2011).
212 President’s Council, supra note 207, at 1.
213 Id.
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have to pay the fixed costs of a manufacturing operation. Therefore, [NPEs] have an in-
centive to drag out litigation to increase pressure on defendants to settle the case.214
AIA is an early example of litigation brought by an NPE in biotechnology against re-
searchers.215 NPEs operate from a position of strength. Since they have no products in
the market to threaten, and no research and development operations, they cannot be
counter-sued for infringement.NPEs rely on it beingmore cost-effective to settle or pay
a license fee than to engage in litigation. Given the risk aversion of most research insti-
tutions, thismaymake such institutionsmore vulnerable toNPEs, such as AIA, that are
ready to sue non-profit entities.
While AIA lost its patent rights for the idiosyncratic reasons of inventorship and im-
proper assignment, the case illustrates the defenses that may be raised against NPEs,
including the many avenues to invalidate patents. Recent jurisprudence on patentable
subjectmatter and supportingUSPTOguidelines, stricter standards on utility and new
mechanisms to challenge the validity of claims may all favor defendants against overly
broad or questionable claims asserted by NPEs. However, other policy options to em-
ploy against NPE tactics specifically against research may also be needed.
This case illustrates the use of Authorization and Consent as one such option that
will be available to entities that qualify as government contractors. While remaining a
practical option in some circumstances, the policy solution with the greatest impact
is likely a statutory research exemption or specific legislation targeted at controlling
the excesses of NPEs. Unfortunately, legislative reforms are difficult to achieve, as il-
lustrated by the protracted debates over patent reforms, including the recent America
Invents Act.216 History suggests that such reforms represent a compromise in which no
one stakeholder is fully satisfied. Other policy responses, therefore, should be exam-
ined, including judicial intervention, judicial rules for litigation, and policies and guide-
lines of agencies and institutions that fund and oversee research.
Legislative reform
In 2013, 14 bills were introduced to the US Congress to address issues related to the
actions of NPEs, some of which exempted life sciences companies.217 However, none
214 President’s Council, supra note 210, at 6. As an example of the high cost of litigation, Eliot Marshall doc-
umented that the University of California, San Francisco (UCSF) spent $12M and Eli Lilly and Company
spent $18.5M in 1997 in a patent dispute over the insulin gene (Eliot Marshall, Court Takes a Narrow View
of UC’s Claims, 277 SCIENCE 1029 (1997)). That case ended at the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
(The Regents of the University of California v. Eli Lilly and Company, 119 F.3d 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
215 Another exampledescribed inBlischak,M.P. IPLitigator Jan./Feb., 45–47(2007) isHouseyPharmaceuticals
Inc. v. Abbott Pharmaceutical Inc., et al., No. 01–401 SLR (D.Del). Nov. 27, 2002 aff’d, 366 F.3d 1348 (Fed.
Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1096 (2005) in which the plaintiff patent owner sued nearly 30 innovative
companies in bio-pharmaceutical development in 2001 in theDistrict of Delaware for infringement of several
patents broadly related to cell-based assay technology. The plaintiff lost on the construction of claims that
would have led to a finding of both invalidity and non-infringement.
216 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, supra note 209.
217 InnovationAct,H.R. 3309, 113thCong. (2013), PatentTransparency and Improvements Act, S. 1720, 113th
Cong. (2013), Patent Quality Improvement Act, S. 866, 113th Cong. (2013); Patent Quality Improvement
Act, S. 866, 113th Cong. (2013); Patent Abuse Reduction Act, S. 1013, 113th Cong. (2013); Patent
Litigation Integrity Act, S. 1612, 113th Cong. (2013); Transparency in Assertion of Patents Act, S. 2049,
113th Cong. (2013); Patent Fee Integrity Act, S. 2146, 113th Cong. (2013); Trade Protection Not Troll
Protection Act, H.R. 4763, 113th Cong. (2013); Demand Letter Transparency Act, H.R. 3540, 113th Cong.
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hasmade it through theUSSenate, having beenopposed by universities, invention pro-
motion groups, the patent bar and pharmaceutical companies.218 These groups found
several provisions problematic in themost comprehensive of these bills, the Innovation
Act219.Thefirstwas fee shifting,whichwouldmake the losingparty pay the attorney fees
of the prevailing side, a rarity in theUSThis is in contrast to other countries, such as the
UK and Canada where fee shifting is the norm.The Innovation Act would punish trolls
by shifting costs of abusive litigation tactics to theNPE, if it lost in court.These fees can
be substantial in patent litigation.However, theUSbar argued such a policywould slide
down a slippery slope, that fee shifting would not be limited to patent infringement lit-
igation. A second was joinder, that is, the joining of two or more parties as co-plaintiffs
or co-defendants in a lawsuit where they share similar rights or liabilities. Opponents
were also concerned about heightened pleading and transparency requirements, which
would require all patent owners to detail their infringement claims and accompanying
changes to the discovery process in providing documentation to support their claims.
In addition, discovery rules would be tightened to discourage the NPE tactic of irrele-
vant discovery requests, which drives up attorney fees to encourage settlement.Theone
remaining legislative reform, introduced in July 2014, is theTROLAct220 which specif-
ically targets patent holders that send opaque and misleading demand letters, making
the sending of a demand letter in bad faith punishable as an ‘unfair or deceptive act’
under the Fair Trade Commission Act221. However, this act only targets a small subset
of the problems with NPEs and trolling behavior222 and would not, for example, have
been effective in the case of AIA, which did not send out large numbers of deceptive
demand letters.
Some of these failed provisions in specific legislation, however, have also been the
target of judicial rules. Some rules discourage NPEs by targeting specific tactics and
mitigate the need for specific legislation targeting problematic troll behaviors. NPEs
commonly assertmultiple patents againstmultiple parties, all of whombear the burden
of producing evidence to defend against claims of infringement. NPEs also threaten in-
junctions, whichmay damage the operations of innovative firms. Recent SCOTUS de-
cisions on enhanced standards for injunctions in patent disputes and fee shifting,223 in
addition to America Invents Act reforms limiting the number of defendants that can be
(2013); Innovation Protection Act, H.R. 3309, 113th Cong. (2013); Patent Litigation and Innovation
Act, H.R. 2639,113th Cong. (2013); SHIELD Act, H.R. 845, 113th Cong. (2013); Stopping the Offensive
Use of Patents Act (STOP Act), H.R. 2766, 113th Cong. (2013); End Anonymous Patents Act, H.R.
2024, 113th Cong. (2013). For summary see Patent Progress. Patent Progress’s Guide to Federal Patent
Reform Legislation. See also Patent Progress, Patent Progress’s Guide to Federal Patent Reform Legislation,
http://www.patentprogress.org/patent-progress-legislation-guides/patent-progresss-guide-patent-reform-
legislation/ (accessed Dec. 18, 2014).
218 Joe Mullin, How the Patent Trolls Won in Congress. ARS TECHNICA, May 23, 2014, http://arstechnica.com/
tech-policy/2014/05/how-the-patent-trolls-won-in-congress/ (accessed Dec. 24, 2014).
219 H.R. 3309, supra note 215.
220 Targeting Rogue and Opaque Letters Act, H.R. 4450, 113th Cong. (2014).
221 15 U.S. Code § 41.
222 DanielNazer.TheTROLAct is not Enough to to StopPatentTrolls,ELECTRONICFRONTIERFOUNDATION, Jul. 11,
2014, https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2014/07/when-it-comes-stopping-patent-trolls-trol-act-not-enough
(accessed Dec. 24, 2014).
223 Octane Fitness v. ICONHealth & Fitness, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 981 (2014) (on fee-shifting); eBay Inc. v. MercEx-
change, LL, 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006) (on loosening of rules for injunctions).
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sued in a patent infringement suit,224 all contribute to curbing the litigation excesses of
NPEs.With respect to enhanced standards for pleadings, to increase the investigational
costs for plaintiff NPEs, on 22 September 2014, the Judicial Conference of the US ap-
proved the eliminationof FederalRule 84.Theeliminationmeans the endof bare bones
pleading forms set up in 1934. The Judicial Conference recommended that SCOTUS
approves the change tobringpatent pleading in linewith recent jurisprudence fromthat
court.225 However, the CAFC has resisted heightened pleading in patent lawsuits.226
Further legislative reformswere brought in by theAmerica Invents Act, whichmay be
helpful in some circumstances, especially in challenging overly broad and questionable
claims through the new process for post-grant review.227 This mechanism provides a
faster and less expensive administrative mechanism than litigation to challenge the va-
lidity of patents. Such amechanismmight have been helpful in challengingAIA and has
been available in Europe for some time. The European patent opposition system pro-
vides third parties with a post-grant opportunity to challenge the validity of European
patents without litigation.228 Challenges may be brought before the European Patent
Office because the patent matter is not an invention, its subject matter is excluded
under European patent law, or claims fail one of the three patentability criteria: nov-
elty, inventive step, and industrial application.229
In the case of NPEs bringing suits against publicly funded researchers and their in-
stitutions, the most comprehensive solution would be a statutory research exemption.
The USA has no research exemption or compulsory licensing authority, although the
USGovernment does have use rights subject to ‘reasonable compensation’ to a patent-
holder.Madey v Duke Universitymade clear the very limited research exemption under
US case law230—there are fewer constraints on exclusive patent rights reaching into
research in the US. Indeed, the precedent set byMadey suggests that universities and
other research institutions in the USA are not exempt from infringement liability just
because they are doing research, and this underscores the desirability of a research ex-
emption. However, recent debates over a research exemption in the America Invents
Act further illustrate complexities of legislative reforms. Early drafts of the US patent
reformbill included a research exemption, but it did not become law.One problemwas
in the definition—it is difficult to draw clear distinctions between non-commercial re-
search coveredby a research exemption, research that is translational, and researchwith
commercial intent. However, Australia has recently clarified its research exemption in
its ‘Raising the Bar’ Act of 2012.231 In line with some European jurisdictions, Australia
allows research on and invention rather than research with the invention, thereby pro-
tecting the commercial interests of research reagent companies.
224 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, supra note 209, at § 299.
225 See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007) and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009).
226 Dennis Crouch, Federal Circuit Supports Bare-Bones Patent Complaints, PATENTLYO, Apr. 23, 2013,
http://patentlyo.com/patent/2013/04/federal-circuit-supports-bare-bones-patent-complaints.html
(accessed Dec. 24, 2014).
227 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, supra note 209, at § 6.
228 Art.100, E.P.C. (European Patent Convention).
229 Kristina V.J Cornish. European Patent Oppositions and Biotechnology. 18 NAT. BIOTECHNOL. 899, 899–900
(2000).
230 Madey, 307 F.3d 1351 (2002) supra note 137.
231 Intellectual Property Laws Amendment (Raising the Bar) Act 2012, no. 35, sched. 2 (Austl.)
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A furthermechanismmight be a compulsory licensing authority. Such authoritywas
contemplated but rejected in the 1952 revisions to theUS Patent Act,232 to the chagrin
of some legal scholars, who presciently predicted its absence would cause future prob-
lems.233 The Australian Government also has authority to invoke compulsory licenses,
and ‘Crownuse’ provisions (for governmentpurposes) that provide escape valveswhen
rights holders thwart public interest.234 Those authorities are the subject of a recent
report and recommendations for reform.235 The USA has no equivalent compulsory
licensing authority within its intellectual property laws like other jurisdictions;236 how-
ever, the US Government does have use rights under both the Bayh-Dole Act and Title
28—Judiciary and Judicial Procedure.237
The Bayh-Dole Act was enacted to promote commercialization of government-
funded research. It enabled universities and other institutions that received federal gov-
ernment grants to own resulting patents. However, in allocating rights in inventions
developed in the course of a federal funding agreement, the US Government retained
a ‘nonexclusive, nontransferrable, irrevocable, paid-up license to practice or have prac-
ticed for or on behalf of the USA any subject invention throughout the world’.238 In
other words, the entity receiving federal funding must grant to the federal government
a license in subject inventions and must notify the federal government of those inven-
tions. In addition, theUSGovernment hasmarch-in rights to compel the patent holder
to grant it239 a license under specific circumstances related to the public interest.240
While the NIH, in particular, has received four requests to exercise its march-in rights,
it has never done so.241
232 35 U.S.C. §§ 1–376.
233 Riesenfeld, S. A.University of Pennsylvania Law Review 102, 291–322 (1954).
234 Patents Act 1990, No. 83, s. 133; s. 163 (Austl.)
235 Productivity Commission Australian Government, Compulsory Licensing of Patents, May 27, 2013,
http://www.pc.gov.au/projects/inquiry/patents/report (accessed Dec. 24, 2014). But see Jane Nielsen,
Dianne Nicol & John Liddicoat, Centre for Law and Genetics, Submission No. 3 Productivity Commission,
Compulsory Licensing of Patents Inquiry, Sept. 26,2012, at 13. And Tyrone Berger, Compulsory Licensing
of Patents in Australia: reforming the Landscape of Fencing Us In? 39 MONASH U. L. REV. 915 (2014),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2352316 (accessed Dec. 24, 2014).
236 See LiLanRen,Comparison of 28U.S.C. 1498(A) and Foreign Statutes and anAnalysis of 1498(A)’s Compliance
with TRIPS (comparing compulsory licensing provisions across jurisdictions), 41 HOUS. L. REV. 1659 (2004–
2005).
237 See Morrison Forrester, The GovernmentÀs Patent Policy: The Bayh-Dole Act and Authorization and Con-
sent, Oct. 6, 2002, http://www.mofo.com/resources/news/2002/10/the-governments-patent-policy-the-
bayhdole-act-a˙˙#8 (accessed Dec. 24, 2014) (comparing the history and operation of these two acts).
238 35 U.S. Code § 202(c)(4) (Retention of Rights).
239 It refers not only to the US Government but also to ‘a responsible applicant or applicants’.
240 35U.S.C. § 203 (march-in rights ).Thesemaybe granted in the following circumstances(§ 203(a): ‘(1) action
is necessary because the contractor or assignee has not taken, or is not expected to take within a reasonable
time, effective steps to achieve practical application of the subject invention in such field of use; (2) action is
necessary to alleviate health or safety needs which are not reasonably satisfied by the contractor, assignee, or
their licensees; (3) action is necessary tomeet requirements for public use specifiedbyFederal regulations and
such requirements are not reasonably satisfied by the contractor, assignee, or licensees; or (4) action is neces-
sary because the agreement required by section 204 has not been obtained or waived or because a licensee of
the exclusive right to use or sell any subject invention in theUS is in breach of its agreement obtained pursuant
to section 204’.
241 JohnConloy,Government Refuses toMarch-In Under Bayh-Dole – Again, Jan. 18, 2011Genomics LawReport,
http://www.genomicslawreport.com/index.php/2011/01/18/government-refuses-to-march-in-under-
bayh-dole-again/ (accessedMar. 25, 2015).
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In contrast to the Bayh-Dole Act that applies to federally funded inventions, Autho-
rization and Consent under 28 U.S.C. § 1498 is a form of eminent domain whereby
the federal government may take private property for public use subject to ‘fair
compensation’ to a patent-holder.242 It permits the US Government, or a contrac-
tor/subcontractor acting on its behalf, to use a US patent without the consent of the
patent holder. It has the effect of limiting the remedies available to the patent holder to
fair compensation for the use of the invention, but excludes the most common reme-
dies in patent infringement suits—injunctions and damages.The provision is generally
implemented through the inclusion of an ‘Authorization and Consent’ clause in Gov-
ernment procurement contracts, in the form specified by the Federal Acquisition Reg-
ulations. In this sense, the US Government provides Authorization and Consent to a
contractor/subcontractor to use the patented invention for and on behalf of the US
Government.243 Authorization and Consent was utilized to protect JAX in the AIA lit-
igation and most recently to enable the US activities within an international consor-
tium to generate a research resource of knock out mouse for every gene in the mouse
genome.244
Judicial action and rules for judicial proceedings
Courts, particularly in theUS, have been active in debates over access to research tools.
SCOTUS ruled in June 2013, in a fight over Myriad’s patents on BRCA genes associ-
ated with hereditary risk of breast and ovarian cancer, to invalidate patent claims on
DNA molecules that could be found in nature.245 In contrast, in September 2014, the
Federal Court of Australia (FCA) unanimously upheld Myriad’s BRCA1 gene patent
claim,246 explicitly rejecting SCOTUS’ legal logic that drew adistinctionbetweenDNA
molecules ‘found in nature’ and modified cDNA molecules, which remain patent-
eligible. One notable difference between the decisions was the degree to which the
Courts worried about exclusive rights on information and tools needed to advance
science.
While SCOTUS was primarily concerned with how patent rights might block, or
‘pre-empt’ science and upstream innovation far from commercial application, the Aus-
tralian courts focused almost exclusively on the interests of prospective inventors and
the value of a patent incentive to invest in discovery. The FCA mentioned detrimen-
tal effects on research only in passing, observing that Australia recently broadened its
statutory research exemption from patent infringement liability as noted above.247 The
242 U.S. CONST. amend V.
243 The wording for and procedures relevant for granting Authorization and Consent are outlined in the Federal
Acquisition Regulations 52.227–1 and 27.2012–2, respectively. Authorization and Consent is most commonly
used in defense R&Dcontracts, however, it has been employed for the use and development of research tools.
244 Two international consortia—the International Knockout Mouse Consortium and the International Mouse
Phenotyping Consortium —are constructing standardized mouse models with phenotyping data to study
gene function. These consortia distribute through established repositories in North America, Europe, and
other developed regions. Underlying patents that cover reagents and methods are difficult to identify in this
complex environment the use of authorization and consent to protect the US entities involved in the Con-
sortia. AmritaMishra &Tania Bubela. Legal Agreements and the Governance of the Research Commons: Lessons
fromMaterials Sharing in Mouse Genomics. 18 OMICS 254 (2014).
245 Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013), supra note 5.
246 D’Arcy v. Myriad Genetics Inc., (2014) FCAFC 115.
247 Id.
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FCA emphasized that the patent claimed not information but DNAmolecules manip-
ulated in vitro. SCOTUS, on the other hand, noted that themolecules in test tubeswere
indeed ‘isolated’, but argued that claimson suchmolecules in effect gave exclusive rights
to block access to DNA sequences, the storage and transmission medium of biological
information. The many thousands of papers published on BRCA mutations that use
DNAmolecules produced in the laboratory, and the authors of most such papers, thus
infringed claims that would appear to be upheld by the Australian court.
It is apparent that the two courts relied on different mechanisms to protect research
interests.The Australian court relied on the statutory protections for research outlined
above, and SCOTUS, in the absence of these, focused on the definition of what can be
patented to add clarity to the scope of patent claims. This is part of an ongoing trend.
In addition to its unanimous Myriad decision, and the invalidated method claims on
a diagnostic patent in Mayo v Prometheus (2012) noted above,248 SCOTUS also in-
validated claims on business methods in Bilski v. Kappos (2010)249 and Alice Corp. v.
CLS Bank International (2014).250 The Court of Appeals recently invalidated method
and DNA molecule claims that had not been challenged in the case that went to the
SupremeCourt.251TheUSSupremeCourt has thus imposed constraints on patentable
subject matter in a major patent case for four years in a row, and lower courts are abid-
ing by the new jurisprudence. In response to changing SCOTUS jurisprudence, the
USPTO issued guidance in March 2014 that aroused considerable controversy, and
has recently been revised.252
The Courts may also circumvent the stall in anti-patent-troll legislation in the USA
The award of fees to the winner in the present case involving AIA is an early instance
of what could emerge as a powerful judicial precedent that serves as a disincentive for
NPEs asserting invalid patents. New legal rules make it easier to assess costs to losers
in patent suits. The federal district court thus awarded legal fees to Avid, so AIA must
pay not only its costs but also fees of the defendant it sued.253 This measure was al-
ready on the books, but the rules for ‘exceptional circumstances’ in which they could
be used were only recently loosened to address patent trolls.The former Chief Judge of
theCourt of Appeals of the FederalCircuit, Randall Rader, urged exactly this remedy to
discourage patent suits based on invalid patents.254 Legal scholars have similarly touted
‘loser pays’ rules as a potent tool both to dissuade enforcement of invalid patents aswell
as to discourage infringement of valid patents.255 Proceedings to determine who pays
the legal fees in Alzheimer’s Institute of America v Avid Radiopharmaceuticals are enter-
ing the endgame supervised by amagistrate in Florida courts.256 One problemwith this
procedure is that it is largely secret. We may never know the price AIA paid for losing
248 Prometheus Lab., 566 U.S. 10 (2012), supra note 5.
249 Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010), supra note 5.
250 Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Intern., 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014), supra note 5.
251 D’Arcy v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., supra note 244.
252 US Patent and Trademark Office, 2014 Interim Guidance on Patent Subject Matter Eligibility,
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2014-12-16/pdf/2014-29414.pdf (accessedMar. 25, 2015).
253 Octane Fitness, 134 S. Ct. 1749 (2014), supra note 221.
254 Randall R. Rader et al.,Make Patent Trolls Pay in Court,N.Y. TIMES, Jun. 4, 2013, at A25.
255 JonathanMasur & AnupMalani, Raising the Stakes in Patent Cases, 101 GEO. L.J. 637 (2013).
256 Magistrate Judge Faith Angell scheduled aDec. 2, 2014 hearing.There were 21 attorneys copied on the order
scheduling the hearing (LexMachina, supra note 80) .
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this case, and yet the power of the ‘loser pays’ precedent depends on those contemplat-
ing litigation knowing the risks and costs.
Policies and guidelines
It is apparent from theAPPswe case that institutional policies and guidelines, supported
byStateLaw, also came into play.One reason thatAIA lost its patent rightswas byoper-
ation of Florida law, under which patent rights automatically vested in the USF. When
patent rights areheldby institutions, policies, andguidelinesonhowuniversities license
inventions may significantly impact the role of NPEs.257 The Association of University
TechnologyManagers recommends some caution in licensing university technologies
toNPEs, for example, and recommendsbest practices for licensing topreserve rights for
research uses.258 However, the guidelines are entirely voluntary,many institutions have
not agreed to abide by them, and they may be trumped by increasing pressures on uni-
versity technology transfer offices to generate revenue through technology licensing.
Other institutions also have significant abilities to curtail the impact of NPEs on the
research community. Technically, NIH has some powerful interventions at its disposal
that it rarely puts into operation: namely march-in rights under Bayh-Dole.259 Rather
than employing the latter in the present case, however, the NIH employed a more ob-
scure process available to it under the Federal Acquisition Regulations.260 Authorization
and Consent, however, only applies to government contractors, and most researchers
holding standard grants from NIH do not fall within this category. There is no case
law to indicate whether this provision would apply to grants, and conventional wisdom
holds that it applies only to government contractors, not grantees.
A further risk to research is aggressive licensingpractices of patent holders against re-
search uses.Thesewere exemplified byDuPont’s initial licensing terms forOncomouse
and cre-lox technologies in the 1990s that included reach-through terms and that im-
posed onerous reporting obligations on researchers. Cetus initially threatened to en-
force its polymerase chain reaction (PCR) patents against academic researchers.261
DuPont andRoche (which acquiredmost rights toCetus’s PCRpatents) backed down
from their most aggressive licensing terms, in the former case after intervention by the
NIH to negotiate access for researchers. The NIH, in other words, can apply pressure
on behalf of the research community for reasonable terms of access to research tools.
Othermechanisms
Finally, private actors are recognizing an opportunity posed by NPEs and are offering
intellectual property insurance specifically directed toward the threat of suits brought
257 Mark A. Lemley, Are Universities Patent Trolls?, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 611 (2008).
258 In the Public Interest: Nine Points to Consider in Licensing University Technology. Mar. 6, 2007,
http://www.autm.net/Nine˙Points˙to˙Consider1.htm (accessed Dec. 24, 2014). Note that while the
Association of University Technology Managers (AUTM) endorses the Nine Points, they originated from
meetings at Stanford University. Note, however, that AUTM is in the process of reconsidering its policy
recommendation on licensing to NPEs and AUTM opposed the Innovation Act, supra note 215.
259 Bayh-Dole Patent and Trademark Amendments Act of 1980, § 203, codified at 35 U.S.C. §§ 200–12.
260 WilliamW. Goodrich, Jr., Past Performance as an Evaluation Factor in Public Contract Source Selection, 47 AM.
U.L. REV. 1539 (1998).
261 Joe Fore et al.,The Effects of Business Practices, Licensing, and Intellectual Property on Development and Dissemi-
nation of the Polymerase Chain Reaction: Case Study, 1 J. BIOMED. DISC. COLLAB. 1, 1, 17 (2006).
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byNPEs, labeled ‘Troll Defense Insurance’.262 Insurance, however, could be a double-
edged sword. In some circumstances, it may encourage NPE suits because insurance
coverage offers deep pockets to target.
CONCLUSIONS
In conclusion, our analysis shows that in the highly competitive research environ-
ment of genetic causes for Alzheimer’s disease in the 1990s, patents played a minor,
subordinate role in spurring both the discovery of disease-related mutations and in
creating transgenic mouse models to explore their biological mechanisms. Patent in-
centives did play a role in determining who hoped tomakemoney once the discoveries
weremade, andhere patent rightswere used to control availability of somemousemod-
els ofAlzheimer’s disease byAthena, Elan, andbyAIA.Corporate strategies to block ac-
cess to research tools were to protect in-house pharmaceutical R&D, all of which failed
to product therapeutics. In other words, eggs were forced into a limited number of bas-
kets to the detriment of scientific and clinical progress.
The scientific teams hunting for Alzheimer’s genes internationally were primarily
motivated by the prospect of high-impact publications in journals such as Nature and
Science. Patents were secondary, and came into play once discoveries were made and
published. Many of the researchers displayed considerable naiveté about patents.
TheUSPTO also made mistakes in prematurely granting patents on transgenic ani-
mals to someone who never developed amodel, and in granting claims similar to those
invalidated inMyriad andMayo. Inparticular, thedevelopmentof effectivemousemod-
els for Alzheimer’s disease was a technologically complex undertaking, requiring in-
tense efforts in both industry and academic research centers well beyond having the
mutation sequence in hand. Academic researchers who developedmousemodels were
not incentivized by patents, and indeed were in some cases sued by those who did the
original sequencing.Work on transgenics wasmotivated by scientific goals, as corrobo-
ratedby freedistributionnetworks and a focusonhigh-impact publications.Transgenic
mouse models were made broadly available to the research community, which made
distribution centers, such asMayo and JAX, thereby vulnerable to patent infringement
suits. Judge Pauline Newman raised a reasonable concern about the value of patent in-
centives to create transgenic animal models, but in this case, patents appear to have
had the opposite effect—being used to attempt to limit distribution of animal models
once they had been created, rather than as a spur to encourage their creation in the
first place.
The case produces amixedmessage about the patent system. It both illustratesmany
mistakes in howpatents were obtained, administered, and enforced, but, in the end, the
legal systemalso rectifiedmanyof thesemistakes, albeit slowly, laboriously, and at great
cost. It seems likely that the bulk of licensing revenue went to support the litigation
muchmore than research.There is little public record to support AIA’s contribution to
research, andmuch legal documentation that indicates that it imposed enormous costs
on the research institutions and private companies it sued. AIA’s contention that it did
not hamper research is not credible. AIA was thwarted from implementing its request
262 PatentInsurance, Intellectual Property Insurance Services Corporation, 2014, http://www.patentinsurance.
com/ (accessed Dec. 14, 2014).
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to shut down the largest distributor of transgenic animal models of Alzheimer’s disease
for research because NIH entered the fray, not because of its own forbearance.
David Morgan of the USF, Tampa, a noted AD researcher who was not involved in
the AIA lawsuits, observed that a flawed patent law system is the real story. ‘The lawyers
are going to make money no matter what happens. Whether AIA wins or loses, there
are lawyers everywherewho benefit.There’s no productive value inwhat they’re doing.’
Another scientist who refused identification for fear of being drawn into pending AIA
suits, ‘This has got to be one of the nastiest things that has happened in the AD field.’
Nevertheless, this same scientist noted Mullan ‘legitimately got these patents. I don’t
fault the guy for insuring his intellectual property is safeguarded.The issue is howmuch
is legitimate policing of IP and howmuch is disregard for scientific progress’.263 Given
the public record, this concedes too much.
AIA clearly puts research institutions in its litigation crosshairs and hampered
Alzheimer’s research in order to extract money without significantly contributing to
the field or advancing delivery of a service or therapeutic. The legal system ultimately
neutered AIA’s ability to continue these practices.This is nonetheless a cautionary tale
that broad exclusive patent rights applied to research tools can (and did) become real-
world impediments to biomedical research.
EPILOG: WHERE ARE THE KEY ACTORS NOW?
Elan Pharmaceuticals: in January 2002, Elan became embroiled in an accounting scan-
dal. Its stock prices sank to $14.80, and an investigation was launched by the US Se-
curities and Exchange Commission. This company that was once the most capitalized
company in Ireland, had a historic fall from its peak of 50.27–16.50 Euros on the Irish
stock exchange. By April, Elan’s shares were worth $11.32 on the New York Stock Ex-
change. Later in thedecade, Elan recovered somewhat, but in 2010,Elanwasfined$203
million for its marketing of epilepsy drugs. On December 18, 2013, Elan was acquired
by Perrigo Company PLC for approximately $8.6 billion USD.264 Perrigo is a global
healthcare supplier of over-the-counter and generic prescription pharmaceuticals, nu-
tritional products, and active pharmaceutical ingredients.
Alzheimer’s Institute of America: the AIA retains a website with tagline ‘Support-
ing Brain ResearchWorldwide’ with a copyright date of 2009.265 All links on research,
technology, commercial and academic licensing opportunities, and funding opportuni-
ties request viewers to ‘please check back later’ because AIA is working ‘to update our
website and anticipate having the information you’ve requested available online soon’.
The site posts two initiatives—a global family initiative for patients and families and
a research initiative with grants, fellowships, and a research portal, none of which are
active.
263 Landhuis & Strobel, supra note 83.
264 Arthur J. Shannon et al., Perrigo Company plc Completes Acquisition of Elan Corporation, plc, (2014),
http://perrigo.investorroom.com/2013-12-18-Perrigo-Company-plc-Completes-Acquisition-of-Elan-
Corporation-plc (accessed Dec. 18, 2014).
265 Alzheimer’s Institute of America Inc., Supporting Brain Research Worldwide, 2009, http://www.
alzheimersinstitute.com/index.php (accessed Dec. 15, 2014).
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AIA Foundation: the Foundation website has the tagline ‘Sharing Memories for a
Lifetime’.266 Its last blog entry is dated August 16, 2012. The website states that the
Foundation was founded in 1992 but that is founding date for AIA, the Foundation
was founded in 2010.The donation pages remain active.There is no evidence available
of projects funded by the AIA Foundation.
Brian Sexton: Mr Sexton is currently involved in litigation over real estate.
John Hardy: Hardy returned to the UK in 2007 and is now a Professor of Neuro-
science at University College London after a period at the National Institute of Aging,
Bethesda, Maryland. He has over 23,000 citations and is the most cited Alzheimer’s
disease researcher in theUK(5 internationally).267 Hewas elected aFellowof theRoyal
Society in 2009.
Michael Mullan: Mullan’s highest impact publications were the result of his collab-
oration with Hardy. In the 1997–2002 time period, after Hardy left USF, Mullan pub-
lished 78 articles, with one in Science and one inNature Neuroscience, both highly cited
and both with Mullan as senior author.268 In 1996, he had a senior authored paper in
Nature which has been cited 502 times. While Mullan is still referred to in newspaper
reports as a leading Alzheimer’s disease researcher, since leaving USF for the Roskamp
Institute in 2003, he has published 90 articles, none in top-tier journals such as Science
andNature. This may reflect a focus on commercialization. He is now the CEO of Star
Scientific Inc. under the new name of Rock Creek Pharmaceuticals.
Star Scientific Inc. and Rock Creek Pharmaceuticals: Star Scientific Inc., was a di-
etary supplements company ‘whose former top executive was embroiled in a gift-giving
scandal with former [Virginia] Gov. BobMcDonnell’.269 The companymoved to Sara-
sota, Florida. The company was a former maker of discount cigarettes that switched
to alternative tobacco products followed by dietary supplements. The company now
states that its focus is on pharmaceutical development for Alzheimer’s disease. The
Herald Tribune reported that the Roskamp Institute was interested in taking over an
anti-inflammation drug that had shown promise and that had been developed by Star
Scientific. The new company plans clinical trials and Mullan believes that following
FDA approval, the company could be an acquisition target for a large pharmaceutical
company, such as Pfizer, Eli Lilly & Co., or GlaxoSmithKline (note ironically that AIA
had sued the first 2 over patents held by Mullan).270 Star Scientific had, however, run
afoul of the FDA by making inappropriate health claims for one of its dietary supple-
ments (over-the-counter drugs). To counter the unfavorable publicity,Mullan asCEO
changed the name to RockCreek Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Star had developed a prescrip-
tion version derived from anatabine, an alkaloid present in tobacco, tomatoes, and egg-
plants. The compound is sold for anti-inflammatory effects and Alzheimer’s disease.
266 AIA Foundation, Alzheimer’s Institute of America, 2014, http://aiafoundation.org/ (accessed Dec. 18,
2014).
267 UCL, John Hardy, Reta Lila Weston Institute, 2014, http://www.ucl.ac.uk/rlweston-inst/people/john (ac-
cessed Dec. 18, 2014).
268 All publication and citation data from Scopus (search conducted 10/7/2014).
269 John Reid Blackwell, Star Scientific Changes Name and Moves Offices to Florida, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH,
June 3, 2014. http://www.richmond.com/business/local/article 4f447fc4-eb2a-11e3-89c1-001a4bcf6878.
html (accessed Apr. 1, 2015).
270 Michael Pollick, Roskamp Taking Over Promising Drug Firm, HERALD-TRIBUNE, Apr. 8, 2014.
http://www.heraldtribune.com/article/20140408/ARTICLE/140409674 (accessed Apr. 1, 2015).
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Mullan owns stock options on six million shares. One commentator stated his guess
‘that there will be conversations with amajor pharmaceutical partner going on over the
next two years, and that a deal of some sort will be struck’.271
Roskamp Institute: the Roskamp Institute is listed as collaborator with RockCreek,
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., and as sponsor of one completed clinical trial for a dietary sup-
plement, Anatabine (NCT01607619) and a second suspended study of a second di-
etary supplement, Anatabloc in Alzheimer’s disease (NCT01669876).272 The com-
pleted study was last verified in January 2013, after approval in February 2012; the
clinical trial sponsor was the Roskamp Institute. However, no results were posted as
of December 2014 from this trial which aimed to enroll 117 healthy adults (not adults
with Alzheimer’s disease). The listed investigators did not include Mullan. A second
study was also listed under another investigator, to enroll 200 people aged 65–90.
NOTE ADDED IN PROOF
On March 30, 2015, Judge Savage issued an order on fee shifting.273 In addition, he
appointed a Special Master to report and recommend on the reasonable attorney fees
incurred by the defendants in the litigation.274 In issuing his order on fees, Judge Sav-
age appliedOctane’s interpretation of Section 285 of the Patent Act, which allows attor-
ney’s fees to be awarded in an “exceptional case”.275 Octane held that “an exceptional
case is simply one that stands out from others with respect to the substantive strength
of a party’s litigating position . . . or the unreasonable manner in which the case was liti-
gated”.276 Judge Savage described howAIA is such an exceptional case. He stated “The
evidence at trial clearly supports our findings that Sexton, Hardy andMullan conspired
tomisrepresent the true inventorship of the Swedishmutation inventions in an effort to
ensure that ownership of those inventions could not be claimed by Imperial College;
and that they intentionally hid the discovery of the mutation from USF to avoid its
claiming rights in the invention.”277 He concluded by stating “The deception, the plan-
ning, the executionof the schemeand themotivationofAIA, Sexton,Mullan andHardy
were hardly common or ordinary. Indeed, their conduct was rare and beyond common
decency.Theyweremotivated by ego and greed. Bringing this actionwas nothingmore
than a perpetuation of the conspiracy.”278 He determined that “AIA should be held




273 Alzheimer’s Inst. of America, Inc. v. Avid Radiopharmaceuticals, Memorandum Opinion (E.d., Pa. Mar. 30,
2015).
274 Alzheimer’s Inst. of America, Inc. v. Avid Radiopharmaceuticals, Memorandum Opinion (E.d., Pa. Mar. 30,
2015).
273 Alzheimer’s Inst. of America, Inc. v. Avid Radiopharmaceuticals, Memorandum Opinion (E.d., Pa. Mar. 30,
2015).
274 Alzheimer’s Inst. of America, Inc. v. Avid Radiopharmaceuticals, Memorandum Opinion (E.d., Pa. Mar. 30,
2015).
275 Octane Fitness, supra note 223.
276 Id. supra note 1 at p. 1756.
277 AIA v. Avid, supra note 1 at p. 5.
278 Id. at p. 6.
279 Id. at p. 6.
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